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LETTER

TO

Mr DODWELL;

Wherein all the ARGUMENTS in
his *Epistolary Discourse* against the
Immortality of the SOUL are
particularly answered, and the
Judgment of the Fathers concern-
ing that Matter truly represented.

By SAMUEL CLARKE, D. D. Rector of
St James's Westminster, and Chaplain in Ordinary to Her MAJESTY.

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A

LETTER

TO

Mr *DODWELL, &c.*

SIR,

IT is a thing of very ill consequence, when Men of great Reputation in the World for Learning, in their Discourses upon the most important Doctrines of Religion, rashly and upon very little Grounds, allow themselves to advance new and crude Notions, and extravagant Hypotheses; which the Profane *will* not, and the Weak are not *able* to separate, from the principal and fundamental and most necessary Doctrines themselves.

For, as in Natural Philosophy and in the search after Physical Truth, the Systems and Hypotheses which ingenious Men invent for explaining the appearances of Nature, and which for some time are received with applause, but afterwards

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are confuted by Reason and Experience ;
are apt to make Men think the Natural
Causes of things absolutely impossible
to be discovered at all ; and have really
such an effect upon very Many, as to
make them reject for their sake, or at
least to call in question, even the cer-
tainest Truths which have been discov-
ered by plain Experiments or clear Ma-
thematical Demonstration it self : So in
Matters of Religion likewise, the in-
considerate and groundless Notions, which
Men of great Learning and much Read-
ing, have with too little Judgment some-
times joined and intermixed with their
explications of some of the greatest and
most important Doctrines of Religion ;
when upon due Examination, the absurd-
ity and inconsistency of such Schemes
plainly appears ; have been apt to raise
Doubts in many Mens Minds concerning
the Truth even of the certainest Do-
ctrines themselves, which are either the
most plainly discovered by right Reason,
or are most clearly delivered in Scrip-
ture.

You teach that the Soul of Man is na-
turally mortal, and will of it self perish
and come to nothing, if not upheld by
the extraordinary Power of God, in a
præternatural way. Many, who see the
imprudent Title of your Discourse, and
will

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will not take the pains to read the Book it self, will conclude that you suppose the Soul to perish at the dissolution of the Body ; And all Liberties, when they *have* read and considered all that you offer, will still conclude, that if (as you grant to them) the Soul must of it self naturally perish sometime or other, there is no time so probable when it should perish, as at the dissolution of the Body ; and they will easily perswade themselves to rely upon this, that God will not work a perpetual Miracle to preserve them præternaturally by his omnipotent Power, on purpose to inflict upon them an eternal Punishment, which by Nature they were not capable of undergoing.

These Mens conclusion indeed is by no means right ; But it is such a one, as is very natural for Men of loose Principles and vicious Lives to draw from your Doctrine ; And therefore you ought to have been very careful not to give them such an occasion of deceiving themselves, unless you had first been very sure that your Notion was either very plainly contained in Scripture, or very clearly demonstrable by right Reason : Which that it is not, I presume will appear from the following Observations.

You

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You begin with a distinction (*Præmon.* Sect. 3.) that the Souls of some Men are made immortal by the *Spirit* of God, to Happiness; and the Souls of some others, by the *Will* of God, to Punishment. Now what can be more precarious and groundless than this distinction? For what real difference is there in the thing it self, between being immortalized by the *Spirit*, and by the *Will* of God; *Eternal Life and Happiness* is indeed constantly attributed to the *Spirit of God*; that is, those only who have the *Spirit of God*, and are guided by it, who obey the Will of God, and live in conformity to his holy Laws, shall be partakers of *Eternal Happiness*: And thus the *Spirit of God* is indeed necessary to qualify Men for, and to make them capable of, the *Happiness of Heaven*. But if, to make good Men capable of an *Eternal Duration* in order to that Happiness, it be necessary that the *Spirit of God* give them a new *Principle of Substance*, or superadd a new *Substance to their Souls*; (as your obscure Expressions concerning the *Accession of an adscititious Spirit*, &c. frequently seem to signify; and without which, there is no other difference than only in Words, between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will* of God;) then nothing can be more contrary to reason, than to suppose any

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Men made immortal without the addition of that new Principle ; nor can any representation of God's Proceedings, be more harsh and incredible, than to suppose him by his Omnipotent *Will* and Power, eternally and miraculously preserving such Creatures unto endless Punishment, who never had in them, either *originally* or *additionally*, any Principle of Immortality at all. How *plainly* and how *very much* more agreeable to Reason and to our natural Notions of God is it, to say that all Creatures who shall ever undergo eternal Punishment, are such as having been created *naturally* immortal, and by wilful continuance in Sin having so far depraved themselves as to become uncapable of eternal Happiness, must consequently by the just Judgment of God fall into such Misery, as their immortal Nature so corrupted necessarily makes them liable to. When we speak of the Soul as created *naturally* immortal, we mean that it is by the *Divine Pleasure* created such a Substance, as not having in it self any Composition, or any Principles of Corruption, will *naturally*, or *of it self* continue for ever ; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any Power of Nature, be dissolved or destroyed ; But yet nevertheless depends continually upon God, who has power to destroy

stroy or annihilate it, if he should so think fit. When therefore you say that the *Original of the Immortality of such Souls as shall be eternally punished, may be more agreeably derived from the Divine Pleasure, than from the Nature of the Soul;* if thereby you mean that the Soul was made immortal by the *mere pleasure* of God, in opposition to its being immortal by the *necessity of its own Nature*, in the sense that God is immortal; then indeed not *Plato* only, but all others also that ever held the Immortality of the Soul, have been and are of the same Opinion: But if, by those Words you mean, as through the whole of your Discourse you expressly declare, that the Soul was created mortal, but by the Divine Omnipotence is upheld eternally; then it is, on the contrary, evidently far more agreeable to right Reason and to our Notions of God, to derive the Immortality of the Soul, and especially of a miserable one, from its *own Nature*, than from the *Divine Pleasure*; that is, to suppose the Soul to have been at first created such a Substance, as by the ordinary concourse of Divine Providence would continue for ever; than that it was created of a mortal and perishable Nature, but by the extraordinary and miraculous Power of God, is continually supported, only to endure Torment

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ment and Punishment, beyond the capacity of its own Nature, to all Eternity.

There cannot easily be made a worse representation of God's dealings with Mankind, than what you affirm (*Præmon. Sect. 4.*) that if the Devils had not fallen, there had been no Hell at all ; and that Mankind is no otherwise concerned in it, than as, by joyning themselves to the Devils Party, they intitle themselves also to his Punishment. 'Tis true, the Fire of Hell was first and originally prepared for the Devils, because they were the first and original Offenders. But to say that, without their Fall, there never would have been any Hell at all ; and that the same or equal Punishment should not then have been inflicted upon Wicked Men for the same Crimes, as there now shall ; is representing God like an Arbitrary Tyrant, who without caring to make an exact, equal, and particular distribution of Justice, deals with all Offenders of all ranks and degrees alike, because they have all interpretatively joyned in opposing his Authority.

You affirm expressly (*ibid.*) that the Soul does not depend on our gross Organical Bodies, nor perishes upon its dissolution from those Bodies. I beseech you, if the

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Soul be such a Substance as is incapable of being hurt by so great a change and dissolution, as is caused in us by a violent Death, suppose by Fire; upon what Principle can it be imagined to be naturally mortal; or what Revolutions in Nature will it not be able to resist and supervive? You explain this further, by saying, that Mens Souls do not so depend on any other created Being, but that they may still continue in their duration, whatsoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary for their continuance. And is not this the very definition of Immortality? or did ever any Man mean more than this, when he affirmed the Soul to be naturally Immortal? You distinguish it indeed from the Natural Immortality of Angels; but by such a distinction, as includes not in it any the least difference. For what difference is there between affirming concerning Angels, that it is in the Power and Pleasure of God, to annihilate them when he thinks fit; and concerning Humane Souls, that they do not so depend on any other created Beings, but that they may still continue in their Duration, whatsoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which

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which is essentially necessary for their Preservation? And yet in the very next Words, you very inconsistently imagine the Soul, as being a mere *Flatus*, to have a more immediate Dependence on God than other Creatures, than even the meanest Particles of lifeless Matter have; which must make it cease to be, whenever he is pleased to cease to breath it; as being unable to continu its Duration, by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general. According to these last Words, the Soul not being so much as a Substance of any kind at all, is likely to be more effectually destroyed by Death, than even the Body it self. Whereas according to the Words just preceding, your Scheme ought to have been on the contrary, that the Soul is by Nature Immortal, and must be mortalized by the Omnipotence of God, if ever it perish; and not, that it is by Nature Mortal, and must be immortalized by a new Act of Omnipotence, to enable it to subsist for ever. So that here, you seem to have framed no consistent Notion even of your own Scheme.

What you advance (Præmon. Sect.
5 concerning its not having been cul-
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pable to hold commuication and joyn with the Devil, before the Publication of the Gospel ; and that the Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick Enemy, before his being declared so by the Gospel ; is so extravagant, that it needs no Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy when he tempted our first Parent ? And was he not publickly declared to be so, in the Curse pronounced to him thereupon ? Is not the Devil described as a publick Enemy to God and good Men, in the History of *Job* ? And as an Enemy to *Israel*, *1 Chron. 21, 1* ? Or was he known to be an Enemy in *Temporal Affairs* only, (*Præmon.* pag. 41,) and could not be known to be so in things relating to the Life to come ? Or had the Patriarchs, no expectation at all of a *better City* to come, after the present *Tabernacle* was dissolved ? Is not *Idolatry* in the Old Testament constantly branded with as severe a character of *Rebellion* against God, as in the New ? And in the Heathen World, before the *Gospel* was begun to be preached, (though *the times of that Ignorance* God did indeed *wink at*, that is, would not be so severe in punishing them, as those who should afterwards sin against greater Light;) yet was it no Crime, to *worship the Creature more than the Creator*? was it no Fault that

that the World did καταλαμβάνειν πάντα, lie under entire subjection to the *Evil One*, 1 Joh. 5. 19? and in the *Power of Satan*, Acts 26, 18? Were not the abominable Rites of the Heathen, plainly a sacrificing to Devils? And do not all the Antient Fathers, for whose judgment you express so great an esteem, suppose in all their Writings against the Pagans, that before the proposing of the Gospel to them, they ought to have known from the Light of Nature and Right Reason, that those impure Spirits whose worship was attended with all manner of bestiality and wickedness, were professed Enemies to God and Goodness? Nay, does not St Paul himself expressly affirm, that *That which may be known of God, was manifest enough to them, to have preserved them from Idolatry?* and that, because *they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, but changed the Truth of God into a Lie, for that Reason God gave them up unto vile affections, &c.*

Nor is it less absurd, to found (as you do in the same place) the Heinousness of Sin and the Reasonableness of the Severity of its Punishment, principally upon its being *interpreted* as a joyning with the Devil. Idolatry indeed, and Witchcraft, and Profane Scoffing at God and all Religion, may justly enough

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pable to hold commuication and joyn with the Devil, before the Publication of the Gospel ; and that the Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick Enemy, before his being declared so by the Gospel ; is so extravagant, that it needs no Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy when he tempted our first Parent ? And was he not publickly declared to be so, in the Curse pronounced to him thereupon ? Is not the Devil described as a publick Enemy to God and good Men, in the History of *Job* ? And as an Enemy to *Israel*, *1 Chron. 21, 1* ? Or was he known to be an Enemy in *Temporal Affairs* only, (*Præmon. pag. 41,*) and could not be known to be so in things relating to the Life to come ? Or had the Patriarchs, no expectation at all of a *better City* to come, after the present *Tabernacle* was dissolved ? Is not *Idolatry* in the Old Testament constantly branded with as severe a character of *Rebellion* against God, as in the New ? And in the Heathen World, before the Gospel was begun to be preached, (though *the times of that Ignorance* God did indeed *wink at*, that is, would not be so severe in punishing them, as those who should afterwards sin against greater Light;) yet was it no Crime, to *worship the Creature more than the Creator*? was it no Fault that

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enough come directly under this charge ; and all other Sins also may in effect and in event, not improperly be looked upon as a promoting the Interest of the Devil, and an opposing the establishment of the Kingdom of God. But to make the *formal Reason*, the heinousness and demerit, not only of Idolatry, Witchcraft and Profane open Opposition of Religion, but also of all other Sins whatsoever, to consist not so much in the original depravity of the Actions themselves, in their contrariety to Right Reason and to the Light of Nature and Conscience, in their opposition to the Nature and Will and Law and Authority of God, as in their being *interpretatively* a joyning and communication with the Devil; To suppose God inflicting upon Men such a Punishment, not as their Sins deserve in their own Nature, and such as the Nature of their own Souls makes them capable of falling into by wilful and obstinate corruption and depravation of themselves,

* *Praemon.*
p. 30.
† *ibid.* p.
28.

but such as * is *disproportionable to their Nature*, and † exceeding the natural Powers of their degree of Being ; and to account for this, only by saying, that Christ will so interpret their not joyning with Him, as if they had joyned themselves to the Devil; Is not all this, to make God, in the hardest Sense, act * *arbitrarily* ?

Your

Your Interpretation of Rom. 2. 12.
and of Job. 3, 19. (Præmon. Sect. 6.)
is so loose and Groundless, that *any Text*
may in the same manner be brought to
prove *any thing*, or rather *no Text* can
really prove *any thing* at all. For if
when St Paul says, Rom. 2, 12. *that as*
many as have sinned without Law, shall
also perish without Law; and as many as
have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by
the Law; the Word *perish* be not evidently
Synonymous to being *judged or condemned*, and signifies that every Sinners con-
demnation or punishment shall be pro-
portionable to the heinousness of his Sin
with respect to the Light he sinned against;
but on the contrary from the Word
[ἀπολεῖται] *shall perish*, it can be concluded
that the Persons spoken of shall only
barely cease to be, in opposition to the
Word [κατιστούται] *shall be judged or con-
demned*; It will follow equally from the
use of the same Word in other places of
Scripture, that neither rejecters of the
Gospel, nor wicked Christians, nor even
the Devils themselves, shall be condem-
ned to any other Punishment, than bear
ceasing to be: For of all these it is said
in several Places of Scripture, that [ἀπο-
λεῖται] *they shall perish or be destroyed:* And
thus you unwarily overthrow all the
Threatnings of the Gospel. Again, if
when

when our Saviour says, *Joh. 3. 19*, that *This is the condemnation, that Light is come into the World, and Men love Darkness rather than Light*; his plain meaning be not this, that the clear Revelation of the Will of God made to Mankind in the Gospel, and the express denunciation of his Wrath against Sin, is the great *Aggravation* of impenitence, and that which makes Mens obstinately continuing in their Sins utterly inexcusable, and their condemnation evidently most just, because they cannot now pretend ignorance of their Duty; but the Words [*Ἄνθειος*] *This is the Condemnation*, must signifie a particular Kind of Punishment to be inflicted upon Men for *Associating with the Devil* as being the *Prince of Darkness*; I cannot see but by the same Liberty, any Afferter of any new Opinion may interpret any part of Scripture so as to countenance any the most groundless Fancy or Imagination whatsoever.

Is it not a very weak Hypothesis, to imagine that the Souls of Men must needs be naturally Mortal, because otherwise God would not know how to dispose of the Souls of the Heathen; since there cannot be any third Eternal State, suitable to the Nature of a Rational Soul; neither happy, nor miserable; as there must be, if those

those Souls be naturally Immortal? (Præmon. p. 43.) Is not the Universe large enough, for God to dispose of all his Creatures into States suitable to their Natures? Are there not in Gods House many Mansions? Or will Heaven and Hell be two such Places, in which there will be no Differences of States, no Space for Order and variety of degrees? Does not our Saviour himself expressly tell us, that they who knew not their Masters will, and yet did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes? And does not St Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, plainly declare that Gentiles as well as Jews shall be judged according to their Works?

The rest of your Præmonition, being upon a different subject, I forbear to consider at this time.

In the Discourse it self (Sect. 2,) you propose a most dark and unintelligible Notion, concerning [$\delta\omega\eta$ and $\pi\nu\sigma\mu\alpha$] Soul and Spirit; not only distinguishing the rational Soul from the sensitive; which was the Philosophy of many of the Antients; but moreover making the Spirit different from both, and wholly præternatural to Man. The whole natural
C Soul

Soul (*ψυχή*), including both the *sensitive* and the *Rational* part, (which you elsewhere call the two Souls, pag. 220,) you suppose to be of it self mortal, but to be made immortal in good Christians by the addition of the *Spirit*, (by the *Accession of an Adscititious Spirit*, as you sometimes express it) and in the rejecters of the Gospel to be made immortal without it. If by the *Spirit* you mean only an *Operation* of the *Spirit of God* upon our Souls, then (as I observed before) there is no real difference between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will of God*. But if by the *Spirit* you mean the addition of a new Substance or Principle of Subsistence to the Souls of good Christians in order to immortalize them, which yet in them that reject the Gospel are immortalized without that addition; is not this just such another supposition, as if you should suppose the *Understanding* to be one Substance in a Man, and the *Will* another, and the *Habit of Virtue* a third; notwithstanding that at the same time it be confessed that all these things may be Faculties or Powers of one and the same Substance? And your perverting the words of St *Paul* to serve your obscure Hypothesis is very gross. Does St *Paul* when he distinguishes the *natural Body* [*φυσικὸν σῶμα*] from the *Spiritual Body*

dy [πνευματικὸς σῶμα] and calls the one *corruptible*, the other *in corruptible*; mean that the *natural Body* [φυσικὸς σῶμα] is therefore *corruptible* or *mortal*, because the *Soul* [ψυχὴ] or *Principle of Life* which is in it, is it self a * *mortal Principle*? or that * pag. 3. the *Spiritual Body* [πνευματικὸς σῶμα,] is made *in corruptible* by the superaddition of a *Spirit* to the *Soul* that animates it? The plain meaning of St Paul is only this, that the *Body* which in this present state is dissolvable and *corruptible*, shall after the resurrection, by the Power of God, be made *in corruptible*; without having any respect at all to the *Soul*, or the *Nature* of it, in his whole Discourse. Again, when St Paul derives our Title to the *Resurrection* of the *Body*, wholly from Christ; does he thereby mean to affirm, that, without the *Resurrection* of Christ, the *Souls* of Men must also have ceased to exist? On the contrary, for that very reason, because the *Souls* of Men would not have ceased to exist; therefore Christ thought them of value to redeem them from Misery, by the purchase of his Blood, by his Death and Resurrection. And 'tis the worst representation of Christianity, that can be; something that might indeed * be thought hard dealing; * pag. 5. to suppose (as you do) that the *Gospel* of Christ, which is every where in Scrip-

ture represented as the greatest Instance of God's tender Mercy and Compassion towards Men, should upon the whole so *very disproportionately* increase the Misery of sinful Men, as that whoever disbelieved or neglected that new offer of Grace and Favour, should from thenceforth be condemned to everlasting Torments ; notwithstanding that otherwise Sin, in its own Nature, against the Light of Reason and Conscience and the natural Law of God, was so little heinous, that had it not been for the Offer of this new extraordinary Grace and Favour, they that had lived in the utmost contempt of God and of his natural and eternal Law written in their Hearts, and in the most unrestrained practice of all possible wickedness, might have been safe from the fear of any other danger, than that of perishing finally by a natural Mortality.

Your Conclusion from our Saviours description of the last Judgment, *Mat. 25*, is very extraordinary ; [Sect. 3 ;] that because the *rewardableness* of the good Works of the Righteous, is there ascribed to their having been done for *Christ's* sake ; therefore no other Persons shall be concerned in that Judgment but those to whom the Gospel had been made known.

You

You might exactly as well have concluded, that because *Charity* and *Uncharitableness* are the only particular Actions there mentioned, for which Men shall be adjudged to Reward or Punishment ; therefore no regard shall be had to any other *Virtues* or *Crimes* in that final Judgment. It is evident by comparing other places of Scripture, that all kinds of *Actions* shall then be examined ; and it is as evident, that all sorts of *Persons* shall be so too. Those who never heard of the Gospel, 'tis true, cannot be judged by the *same Rule or Form*, as those who did hear of it ; But is it not very wonderful, to conclude from thence, that because * *such persons must be judged by another form* not fully and expressly (suppose) mentioned in Scripture, therefore that *form cannot at all be known*, what it is ; and if that *form could not be known*, yet that therefore it ought not to be believed that there is any such form at all ? Does not the same Light of Reason, which makes Men a *Law to themselves*, necessarily discover also to them at the same time what Rule they shall be judged by ? Neither is it true therefore, that no such Form can be proved from the Scriptures : For does not S. Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, largely declare that there is such a Form, and also what that Form is ?

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is? And does not the Scripture every where plainly suppose, that the Judgment shall be universal? The Phrase of *judging the World*, Acts 17, 31, manifestly implies it; and the opposition between Death and Judgment, Heb. 9, 27, though the stress of the Apostles argument does not indeed lie upon it, and the universal particle [*All*] is not added, yet very evidently supposes the *Judgment* to extend to the very same Persons as *Death* doth. And what difference is there, between saying that 'tis appointed for *Men* once to die, or that 'tis appointed for *All Men* once to die? It is not a just answer here, to say that Universal assertions are frequently in Scripture to be understood in a limited Sense. That can only be so, when either the common acceptation of the words, evidently limits their signification; as in that place you mention, Job. 12, 19; or when some other parallel places of Scripture, expressly add a Limitation. Where this is not the case, as it is not in the phrase of Gods *judging the World*, Acts 17, 31; the same expression being in all other places of Scripture likewise universal; if limitations may be added arbitrarily and at pleasure, there will then be no way left to distinguish at all, when any declaration is to be looked upon as *universal*,

sal, and when as only particular. You your self are forced to allow the Jews, who lived before our Saviours coming, to be concerned in the Judgment ; and not them only, but also Others who lived before the Law, in the Times of *Noah* and the Patriarchs ; because (pag. 11,) *as they were intitled to the Spirit ; in Reversion, so they might be intitled to the Consequences of the Spirit, one of which is Immortality.* I suppose you will easily grant, that the Knowledge many of these Men had of Christ, was but implicit and very obscure : And if that was sufficient to intitle them to Immortality, why is it not as easie to suppose that the Promise God made to *Adam* might intitle all Mankind to have some benefit of the Redemption purchased by Christ, according to their different proportions and capacities, tho' they never heard of him explicitly ?

It may here be observed also by the by, that, according to your obscure and indeed confused manner of expressing your self, you in this Section (pag. 8,) suppose *the Holy Spirit to immortalize Men to Punishment* ; and again (pag. 31,) that Men are qualified for the higher degree of Punishment, by the Accession of the *adscititious Spirit*, which makes them *ἰοδλλεῖοι* : Not very consistently with your first distinction, (Præmon. Sect. 3,) that

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that the actually immortalizing Souls to Punishment, may better be ascribed to the *Pleasure of God*, than to the *Divine Spirit*. Unless you will say, that bad Men within the Covenant, are immortalized to Punishment by one Principle ; and bad Men without the Covenant, or Rejecters of it, immortalized to Punishment by another Principle. And so there is no end of vain and groundless Imaginations.

That there shall be, as you say, (*Sect. 4,*) *a very great difference in the Punishment of those who resist and reject the Gospel, from what it would have been if they had never heard of the Gospel* ; is undoubtedly very true. But does it from thence follow, that God did not † oblige Men at all to worship himself, before any revealed Religion was instituted ? Because & ^{† pag. 11.} ^{‡ pag. 12.} the * Scripture does indeed every where suppose the Condition of those who resist the Gospel dispensation worse than that of the worst sort of Criminals who never heard of the Gospel ; does it from thence follow, that they that never heard of the Gospel, had therefore *no concern at all* in the final judgment ? Because our Saviour declares that it shall be *more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha* in the Day of Judgment, than for those who rejected the Gospel

Gospel when offered them; does it from thence follow, that those wicked People shall not be cast into * outer darkness at all? When our Saviour threatens that *Capernaum, which was exalted to Heaven, should be brought down to Hell;* is it not a very extraordinary Interpretation of the meaning of those Words, and as wonderful an Inference from them, to conclude that those People, if our Saviour had not preached to them, would have † *had no reason to fear the Punishment of Hell at all?* An unprejudiced Person would rather conclude on the contrary, that for that very reason, because they *were in danger of it,* therefore our Saviour preached to them and exhorted them to *repent and flee from the wrath to come.* Lastly, if they that never heard of the Gospel, shall not indeed for their Unbelief be sentenced to || *that Hell,* which was prepared for the Devil and his Angels; that is, to the same Degree of Punishment with those who reject or disobey the Gospel; yet does it at all from thence follow, that they shall have no concern in the general Judgment, upon account of their having obeyed or disobeyed the Law of Nature?

The Case (Sect. 6.) of that Text in
St John, John 5, 28 and 29; The Hour

is coming, in the which all that are in the Graves shall hear his Voice, and shall come forth, they that have done good, unto the Resurrection of Life, and they that have done evil, unto the Resurrection of Damnation, is exactly the same with that before-mentioned, *Acts 17, 31.* The Words are *universal*; and the Instances you bring of other *universal* Affirmations, which must be understood in a *limited* Sense, have not the least similitude with the Text you are considering. If the *Gibeonites universal Declaration to David*, that *for them he should not kill any Man in Israel*, must needs indeed be understood in a *limited* Sense, because they themselves expressly *limited* it by demanding seven of *Saul's Posterity* to be deliver'd to them to be put to death: If *Ahab's sending to all Nations and Kingdoms to search for Elijah*, must indeed of necessity, in the Nature of the thing it self, be understood *only of those that bordered upon him*; If *St Paul's universal Declaration*, that he baptized none of the *Corinthians*, must indeed be understood with *an exception*; because he himself in the very next Words adds *an exception* expressly: is it just to infer from these Instances, that our Saviour's *universal Affirmation* in this place, concerning the Resurrection, may likewise be understood in

in a *limited* Sense, though neither in the Nature of the thing it self, nor from the Context, there be any the least Ground for such limitation? Nay though on the contrary, all the parallel Texts, which are very many, be likewise *universal*? It is a wonderful thing, to see in what manner *Learned Men* can argue, when Prejudices prevail over their *Judgment*.

Your 7th Section, to ordinary Understandings, seems to be mere Confusion. You suppose Man to consist of three distinct parts, *Body, Soul* and *Spirit*: But they who made this distinction, supposed these three parts to be in *all* Men by *Nature*; which will not serve *your* purpose. You bring in *Plato* distinguishing *Mind* [Νέσ] from [ψυχή] *Soul*, and making the one mortal, the other immortal: But this likewise, being spoken concerning the natural Formation of all Men, is nothing to your purpose; For in *your* Hypothesis, you make the *whole* Man by nature Mortal. You mention *Plato* here (pag. 22 and 24,) and again pag. 59 & 96, and *Præmon.* pag. 21, as favouring your own Notions: And yet in other places, (as pag. 33, 60, & 66,) you inconsistently speak of him as justly blamed for holding the contrary Opinion, for asserting Our *Doctrine of the Souls natural Immortality*,

Immortality, pag. 33. You affirm (pag. 23,) that there is no real difference between the Platonical Notions and those of the New Testament, only that That which the Platonists call Mind [Νέος] and make it Immortal, the Sacred Writers call [*πνεῦμα*] Spirit, as being the *Divine Breathing*, Gen. 2. 7 : Here you openly contradict your self, making the immortal [*πνεῦμα*] Spirit, common to all Men by their original Formation, and confounding it with what you elsewhere so

* *Premon.* * often, in allusion to that very Text, pag. 21 & distinguish by the Name [*πνοή*] Breath, 25; and in the Dif- and make it mortal. You bring in *Philo* course it distinguishing the Immortal Soul from the self, pag. 160 and 216. *Sensible formed Man*, as you darkly express it ; But even this also is directly against you : For *Philo* opposing the immortal *Mind* of Man, that is, the rational Soul, both to the Body and to the sensitive Soul, still speaks of them all as *original* and *natural* Parts of the Man ; and therefore when you apply to your Hypothesis of an *adscititious* Spirit, what he says concerning this [*πνεῦμα θεοῦ*] *Di-* *vine Spirit or Soul* infused into Man by God's *breathing*, Gen. 2. 7 ; you again directly contradict your self, by confounding the *Spirit* [*πνεῦμα*] which you suppose immortal, with the [*πνοή*] *Breath or Soul* which you make to be mortal.

Yours

You cite (pag. 26) the Words of *Aratus*, Τὸς γένετοι as approved by St *Paul*, Acts 17, 28 : But if those Words prove any thing, they prove directly against you : For γένετοι, if it signifies any thing, signifies *Off-spring of God* in that Sense which you oppose, (pag. 66.) And though you are pleased to understand them (pag. 66.) only of those that are immortalized by receiving or rejecting the Gospel, yet St *Paul* on the contrary as plainly applies them to all that dwell on the Face of the Earth, as it could be expressed in Words.

In the same Section, (pag. 22.) you call it a precarious Fancy, to make every cause of Motion distinct from Matter, to be properly what we call a Spirit, Independent on Matter, and Immortal : Here you seem to suppose the Soul of Man, to be something distinct from Matter ; yet not a Spirit, nor Independent on Matter, least from thence it should follow that it was naturally immortal. In your Præmonition, pag. 25. you make the Soul, as being a mere *Flatus*, to have a more precarious subsistence, even than mere Matter it self, saying that it is unable to continue its own Duration by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general : Yet

Yet in the same page (as I observed before) you say that Souls do not so depend on any other Created Being, but that they may still continue in their Duration, whatsoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence which is essentially necessary for their continuance : This is making them properly Immortal. In the Discourse it self, pag. 51, you suppose again that the Soul may depend on Matter, as to its Being and Preservation, though it be not a Modification of Matter, but distinct from it : Here you express your self, as if you thought it a Substantial Form, a contradictory Chimæra, which arose merely from the misconstruction of a Greek Word in Aristotle, signifying indifferently either Substantial or Essential : And again, pag. 91, you suppose in like manner, that the Soul is something distinct both from Spirit, and also from Matter and Motion ; that is to say, a Material Form ; an active Substantial Principle, distinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter, in esse, in fieri, in operari, and which must accordingly be dissolved on the dissolution of that Matter on which it depends. In pag. 220, you suppose, on the other hand, the Two Souls (as you call them) to be not only distinct, but also separable : And pag. 218, you seem

seem to incline to the Notion of those Philsophers, who owned the *soul* to be material like the *steams of odoriferous Bodies*; Which Consideration alone, you say, is sufficient to cut it off from any pretensions to any proper natural Immortality. Is not all this, the greatest extravagancy and Confusion that can be? Did not the World know you to be a serious Person, these things would look much more like the Raillery of an Unbeliever, than the Reasonings of one that in earnest intended to establish any consistent Notion. In reality, That the Soul cannot possibly be *Material*, is evident not only from the consideration of its noble Faculties, Capacities and Improvements, its large Comprehension and Memory; its Judgment, Power of Reasoning, and Moral Faculties; which Arguments have been urged with unanswerable Strength by the wisest and most considerate Men in all Ages from the times of *Socrates* and *Plato* to this very Day; but the same thing is moreover demonstrable from the single consideration, even of bare Sense or Consciousness it self. For *Matter* being a divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually separate and distinct parts, 'tis plain, that unless it were essentially *Conscious*, in which case every particle of Matter must consist

consist of innumerable separate and distinct Consciousnesses, no System of it in any possible Composition or Division, can be an individual Conscious Being : For, suppose three or three hundred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given distance one from another ; is it possible that all those separate parts should in that State be one individual Conscious Being ? Suppose then all these Particles brought together into one System, so as to touch one another ; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Composition whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct Beings, than they were when at the greatest distance ? How then can their being disposed in any possible System, make them one individual conscious Being ? If you will suppose God by his infinite Power superadding Consciousness to the united Particles, yet still those Particles, being really and necessarily as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be themselves the Subject in which that individual Consciousness inheres, but the Consciousness can only be superadded by the addition of Something, which in all the Particles must still it self be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whose Power of Thinking is undeniably one Individual Consciousness, cannot possibly be a *Material Substance*. And if it be neither

ther Matter nor any Modification of Matter, than (though you are pleased to affirm somewhat rashly, and without, ^{+ pag. 51.} offering any reason for your affirmation that such Reasoning is far from being Self-evident, yet) it is really as notoriously Self-evident as any thing in Nature, that it cannot possibly depend upon Matter, as to its Being and Preservation. For if even one particle of Matter cannot possibly depend upon another, as to its Being and Preservation, (which I believe you will confess to be Self-evident,) because they are each of them distinct Beings ; must it not be even yet less possible, for a Being which is neither Matter it self, nor a Modification of Matter, but intirely *distinct* from Matter, (pag. 51;) to depend on Matter as to its Being and Preservation ?

It is not indeed of any great Moment in the present dispute ; but it seems to show in general something of hast and inconsistency in your Notions ; what you affirm concerning the Giants, (Sect. 8. who you say, descended from the Sons of Seth and the Daughters of Cain ; and yet in the very same Paragraph you call them the Off-spring of the fallen Angels ; and, upon their account, make two *defections* of Angels, one before the Fall of Adam, the other before the Flood.

E. You

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E

You

You proceed (Sect. 9) to the Authority of the Fathers. *Justin Martyr*, whom you begin with, says indeed expressly, that the Soul ought not properly to be called *Immortal*: But this he says, not as you represent him, in opposition to our Doctrine, nor yet in opposition to *Plato*, but in opposition to the extravag-

^{† Εἰ δὲ σώματά ἡτούχη,} ^{gant Notions of some † pre-}
^{ἀγέννητος οὐλασθή. Αγέν-} ^{tended Platonists, who taught}
^{νητός δὲ τῷ σώματι οὐ} ^{such an Immortality as im-}
^{χεῖ τίνας λεγούντες πάλιν.} ^{plied necessity of existence.}

For, the reason he gives

why Souls ought not to be called *Immortal*, is because * they had a

^{* Αναγκή τῷ τάξι τούχες} beginning, and depend conti-
^{γενέσεως — εἰ δε διά-} nually upon God for the Pre-
^{κατοι. ibid.} servation of their Being. In

which Sense, neither are Angels Immortal; but * God only. All

^{+ Μόνος γάδε αγέννητος τοι} that he says therefore, does
^{αφθαρτός οὐδείς. ibid.} not in the least imply, but

that the Soul may be such a substance, as is able to continue its own Duration for ever, by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general: Which is all that we mean by *natural Immortality*. Nay, that he did actually think the Soul to be in this sense *Immortal*, may justly be gathered from those very words which you yourself

self cite from him: "Οντος μηδε πάσχειν, &c.
What Plato thought concerning the World,
that it must needs indeed be in its Nature
capable of being destroyed and brought to an
End, because it had a beginning; yet that
God would never actually destroy it: The
same may be thought concerning the Soul,
and concerning all things that are or can be,
excepting only God himself (οὐατε οὐαπαύειν)
that they are capable of being destroyed:
Which last words seem clearly to explain
what he means by the word [φθαρτὸν] cor-
ruptible, which he applies not only to
the Soul of Man, but also to all Created
Beings whatsoever; namely, not to signi-
fy any Tendency to Corruption in the
Nature of the thing it self, but only a
Dependence upon the Will of God, in
opposition to Self-existence. He does in-
deed say, that the Souls of the Damned
shall continue to exist *as long as God thinks*
fit; and implies as if he thought they should
finally be destroyed after very long Punish-
ment: But this, not by a natural Morta-
lity, but by the Will of God, who is as
able to destroy if he thinks fit, as to
create: Which Opinion, if there was any
ground for it, would yet signify nothing
at all to your purpose.

Tatians Opinion, if it was of any Au-
thority, would prove too much for you.
For he fancied that the Soul was dissol-

ved with the Body, and rose again with it at the Resurrection. This part you pleasantly call his *Humane Reasoning* (*Sest. 105.*) as if you thought all the rest of what he says in the very same Sentence, was *immediately Divine*. Yet even *He* also is expressly against you. For as he makes *all* Souls to die with the Body, so he makes them *all* to rise again with it also ; leaving none of them in their natural Mortality ; but raising them all either to eternal Happiness, or [διά θα πνεύμα εἰς αἰώνιον ταῦτα δύναται] to immortal Punishment.

Irenæus is so very full and express against you, and your perverting of his words so very gross, that with the same liberty any person might easily make any Author seem to countenance any Heresy or absurd Opinion whatsoever, even from the very Words themselves, wherein he with all possible clearness expresses himself against it. The Passages with you your self cite, are as clear and plain as can be desired. He in express words (as you your self cite them,) declares the

Soul to * be immortal in its
own Nature, and affirms that
it does † not die. To evade
this, you suppose he means
only, that the Soul does
not

* Quæ sunt natura immortalia ; quibus a sua natura adest vivere. lib. 5. c. 4. † ibid. c. 7.

not die in the same Manner that the Body does, namely by ceasing to breathe ; A more surprizing evasion could not possibly have been invented ; His Words, which the Reader would expect you should have transcribed at length, are these ; that *† tis the Body only that dies, not the Soul : For, to die, is to lose the Powers of Life ; Breath, Sense and Motion ; and to be separated into its first Principles of Composition ; which the Soul, the *Flatus vitæ*, and the Spirit which is a simple and uncompounded and indissoluble substance, cannot be :*

*is not the word [Spiramen] Breath, in this Sentence, an excellent ground for your distinction ; that Irenæus by denying that the Soul dies, does not mean to deny that it dies, but only to deny that it dies in the same Manner the Body does, viz. by ceasing to breathe ? Again, He expressly affirms, that *† the Soul and Spirit is not mortal : By this you say he means only, that the Soul does not actually die when the Body dies ; but, being ashamed of this Interpretation, you add immediately, that he means also further,**

that

† Hæc [caro] enim est, quæ morietur & solvitur ; sed non Anima, nec; Spiritus. Mori enim, est vitalem amittere habilitatem, & sine Spiramine in posterum, & inanimalem & immobilem fieri, & deperire in illa, ex quibus & initium substantiæ habuit. Hoc autem neq; Animæ evenit ; flatus est enim vitæ : neq; Spiritui ; incompositus est enim & simplex Spiritus, qui resolvi non potest, lib. 5. § 7.

*† Οὐτε γέ ἡ Ζυχὴ θνητὸν,
εἰ τὸ πνεῦμα, lib. 5. 13.
as the Words are cited by
you : & lib. 5. 7, almost the
same Words again.*

that the Soul in its own Nature, does not consist of contrary Principles, tending to a Dissolution by its own Nature, as the Body does: This is expressly giving up the whole Question; and directly contrary to what you add presently after, that *Death is natural to the Soul on account of its natural constitution.* It is here further to be observed also, that these last words which you your self cite out of *Irenæus*, that *the Soul and Spirit is not Mortal*, [$\sigma\pi\tau\dot{\eta}\dot{\nu}\chi\dot{\eta}\dot{\nu}\pi\tau\dot{\eta}\dot{\nu}\omega\alpha$] are directly contradictory to the Notion you advance, pag. 3, concerning [$\sigma\omega\omega\alpha\dot{\nu}\chi\dot{\eta}\dot{\nu}\omega\eta$] *the natural Body's* being therefore opposed to [$\pi\pi\pi\omega\omega\pi\pi\pi\omega\eta$] 1 Cor. 15, 44, because it has only a *Mortal Principle* [$\dot{\nu}\chi\dot{\eta}$] in it; and also directly contradictory to what you insinuate pag. 41, concerning *Irenæus's* understanding [$\pi\pi\pi\zeta\omega\pi\pi\pi\omega\eta$] *the Breath of Life*, Gen. 2, 7, to be, what You all along would distinguish it to be, a *Mortal Principle*: Which he is indeed so far from doing, that, on the contrary, he, in that very Chapter from whence you have taken most of your Citations, declares [$\dot{\nu}\chi\dot{\eta}$] *the Soul*, not to be mortal,

* Quæ sunt ergo mortalia corpora? nunquid nam Animæ? Sed incorruptibiles Animæ quantum ad comparationem mortaliū corporum. Insufflavit enim in

for * that very reason because it is [$\pi\pi\pi\zeta\omega\pi\pi\pi\omega\eta$] *the Breath of Life*, Gen. 2, 7. Notwithstanding that he does indeed, at the same time,

time, contradistinguish it, as St Paul does, from πνεῦμα ζωούσιν ; The πνεῦμα ζωούσιν being plainly with him, as it is with St Paul, that divine Power which Spiritualizes and Immortalizes, not the Soul, but the *Body*, at the Resurrection.

Irenæus does indeed, with other Ancient Writers, allow, that whatever is γεννητὸν or had a beginning, must be φθαρτὸν, that is, as Justin Martyr expresses it, ὁλός τε ἐξ αφανοδηνῶν, capable of being destroyed. But this is only meant (as the Antithesis of the Words [γεννητὸν] and [φθαρτὸν] evidently shows) of the Nature of the Soul as opposed, together with that of Angels and of all other the highest Created Beings whatsoever, to That Immortality which arises from *Necessity of Existence*, which must needs be peculiar to God alone ; Which is nothing to your purpose.

I cannot see how you collect any thing at all from Athenagoras, (Sect. 12.) He does indeed distinguish οὐκ from οὐχ according to the old Philosophy ; but he does not found any thing upon that distinction, which is in the least to your purpose. He neither affirms the *Soul* to be

faciem hominis Deus *flatum* vita (Gen. 2, 7.) & factus est in animam viventem ; *Flatus* autem *vita*, incorporalis est. Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere hominem ipsum *flatum* vita existentem. Et propter hoc David ait ; & anima mea illi vivet ; tanquam immortali substantia una ejus existente. lib. 5. c. 7.

be mortal, nor makes any doubt but the Bodies of all Men shall rise again unto Judgment. All you pretend to gather from him, is, that the Soul is not it self sufficient to immortalize the Body : But to this you have your self given a full answer, that No Body ever thought it was.

The Words you cite from *Theophilus Antiochenus*, (Sect. 13.) relate wholly to the Question concerning the state of *Adam* in Paradise, whether he was created Mortal or Immortal in that State : Nothing therefore can be gathered from thence, concerning the Nature of a separate Soul. *Theophilus* determines, that He was

* Note ; your Emendation, οὐκείας for οὐδὲ μὲν, in this Passage of *Theophilus*, is without ground. For the Sense is not, [εἰδεῖτο, εἴη μὲν] not so, I suppose ; but [εἰδεῖτο εἴη μὲν] I dare not assert That neither, for my part ; answering to [εἰδεῖτο οὐκείας] in the preceding line ; As any one that pleases to compare your Book, may observe.

* originally by his Creation ; that is, (as you your self explain it, pag. 46.) God neither design'd for him *Corporal Death*, nor *Corporal Immortality* ; but he was capable of being either, according as he should behave himself : But whether *Adam* before his Fall was in that

Sense naturally *immortal*, or naturally *mortal* ; what is this to the Soul ? which, supposing *Adam* never so *mortal*, you your self acknowledge does not perish by that *Mortality* which denominates a

Man

Man Mortal, that is, the Dissolution of the Body.

His saying that from that Text, Gen. 2, 7, most Men [*πλειον*] stiled the Soul immortal; does not imply (as you imagine) that *Theophilus* himself thought it Mortal; but it implies some doubt concerning the proper use of the Word *αἰδάνω*, which (as has been before noted) seemed to many of the Antients to imply as much as *ἀγέννητος* Necessarily existing, (in the Sense that St Paul says of God, 1 Tim. 6, 16, ὁ Μόνος ἐχων αἰδανοιαν that He only hath Immortality;) or at least to signify an indefectible State of Virtue and Happiness: And therefore it is, that he says concerning *Adam*, Ἐαὶ διαβατον αὐτῷ αἴρεσθαι τομοίκει, διδύ αὐτούς τομοίκους: If Adam had been made originally immortal, he had been made a God.

It is also further to be observed from this passage of *Theophilus*, that the Text you so frequently allude to, Gen. 2, 7, was *ἐπαγγελλον* by most of the Antient, understood in a Sense directly contrary to your Notion of the *πνεῦμα* signifying in that place a Mortal Principle. And it is with very extraordinary difficulty, that you here labour to suppose, that [*πλειον*] those most Men whom *Theophilus* affirms to have collected the Immortality of the Soul from this Text of Scripture, were not Christians,

F but

but either Jewish Pharisees or Heathen Philosophers : which Supposition of Heathen Philosophers proving the Immortality of the Soul from a Text of Scripture ; and that a Christian Writer speaking of most Mens Sense concerning a Text of Scripture, should thereby mean the Sense of Heathen Philosophers ; This, I say, with all that follows in that Section, is so extremely absurd, as to need no Confutation.

Tertullian does indeed suppose the Soul to be *Material* ; from whence it must also necessarily be confessed to follow that it would be *naturally Mortal* ; and no one can (as you say, *Sect. 14.*) believe such a Soul as he supposes, to be independent on Matter in its own Nature. All this is very true ; and yet *even This* seems to be nothing to your purpose. For though the *natural Mortality* of the Soul is indeed a necessary *Consequence* of *Tertullian's Doctrine* ; yet, since *Tertullian* did not see nor own that Consequence ; and, if he had seen the Consequence, would have disowned the Doctrine ; his *Authority* (which is what you would make use of) is not for you, though the *Consequence of his Doctrine* be ; And therefore you are guilty of a very manifest Fallacy, when you say (*pag. 55.*)

55.) that the Church had not declared against this Doctrine of Tertullian, which supposed the Souls natural Mortality : For his Doctrine did not then suppose it, tho' our Philosophy shows it to be indeed a Consequence. He says expressly in many places of his Book *de Anima*, that the Soul is *immortal* : He reckons this among those Opinions of the Philosophers which gave occasion to Heresies, that

* some of them denied the Immortality of the Soul : He denied † that the Soul grew or increased in substance, notwithstanding he thought it Material ; least it should follow from thence, that it

was capable likewise of perishing : He

strongly * opposes the Opinion of those who thought the Soul received Nourishment ; least from thence likewise it should follow that it was liable to perish : He expressly affirms, † that all Mankind, without exception, shall rise again to eternal Happiness or Punishment : And many other such Pas-

sages are to be found in his Works. You seem to be aware of this, when you say, that Tertullian does indeed own the actual

* Alii immortalem negant
Animam. cap. 5.

† Cæterum animam substantia crescere negandum est, nec etiam decrescere substantia dicatur atq; ita & defectum credatur. cap. 37.

* Auferenda est Argumentatoris occasio, qui, quod anima desiderare videatur alimenta, hinc quoq; mortalem eam intelligi cupit, quæ cibis sustineatur, deniq; derogatis eis evigescat, postremo subtractis intercidat. cap. 38.

† Restituetur omne humana genus — exinde in immensam aeternitatis perpetuitatem. Id. in Apologetico.

Immortality of the Soul : But then, what you insinuate in your next Words, [Especially of all who were, upon that account, obliged to come over as Proselytes upon the Publication of the Gospel,] is extremely unfair ; since *Tertullian's* Words, being every where as universal as can be, are directly contrary to what you would insinuate by the Word *Especially*.

And here upon occasion of the Passages you cite out of *Tertullian*, concerning *the Propagation of the Soul ex traduce*, and its having a *Humane Shape and Difference of Sex* ; I cannot forbear proposing it to your more calm and serious consideration, whether your manner of citing the Fathers, by picking out chiefly such Sentences, wherein for want of Philosophy they were evidently mistaken, and which can only be of disservice to Religion, and tend to confirm profane Men in their Mockery and Contempt ; is not a very ill representation of those Writers, and a very ill manner of showing your regard to them. I believe, should any other Person do the like upon any other Philosophical Subject, you would immediately look upon him as doing it with an ill design, and deserving a very severe Censure.

What
Will

What you say (Sect. 16.) concerning Tertullian's deriving the Humane Soul from the *Flatus Vitæ* mention'd Gen. 2, 7; proves, not that he thought the Soul Mortal, because you groundlessly interpret that Text so; but that he understood that Text contrary to what you have done, because he clearly declares the Soul derived thence to be immortal: As I have before shown particularly concerning *Irenæus*. And what you offer in the rest of that Paragraph, concerning *proper Immortality* belonging only to God, is all entirely against your self, and not in the least against our Notion; as has likewise been proved before.

The Words you cite out of St *Cyprian*, (Sect. 18.) are evidently nothing to your purpose; being spoken only concerning regeneration or the new birth in the moral Sense, without any the least hint of any natural mortality of the Souls of those who are not regenerated. *Arnobius*, you your self acknowledge to have his Paradoxes on this Subject; that he was but a Catechumen, when he wrote his Book; and was not truly instructed in the Christian Doctrine. But, you say, he is more to be regarded, when he speaks conformably to the Sense of other Catholick Doctors of that early Age, that is, when you think he says

says any thing agreeable to that Notion which you not truly attribute to the Fathers. And yet even *He*, does not say any thing really agreeable to that Notion. For though he does indeed blame the boldness of certain Platonists for sup-

* *Animus*, positing the Soul to be * necessarily Immortal, to have come from Heaven, and to return thither again of course at the dissolution of the Body ; running out with much oratorical Liberty upon the weakness of those Mens Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul ; and does Himself contend that the Soul is of a

† middle Nature, neither mortal, nor immortal, but capable of either condition according to its behaviour ;

yet all this he does purely upon *That Argument*, that whatever had a beginning must also necessarily be capable of being destroyed ; and that whatever is possible, must needs in its Nature be liable to perish ; and accordingly therefore applies it to Angels * and all

* *Omnis omnino*, Dii, Angeli, Dæmones, aut nomine quocunq; sunt alio, qu. iratis & ipsi sunt mediæ, & ambiguæ sortis conditione mutabiles. lib. 2.

other Created Beings whatsoever, in the very same Sense as he does to Men : which is not the Notion of Mortality *You* are contend-

ing for. And when he supposes the Souls of the Wicked to perish finally, (which

(which you imagine to be for your purpose;) he understands it of *all* the damned, as well those that *had heard* the Gospel, as those that *had not*; and those that *had received the Spirit*, as those that *had not*; conceiving them *all* to be destroyed by the Power of God inflicting such Punishment upon them, and not that *any* die by a *natural mortality*.

Lactantius is throughout his whole Work as full and express against you, as any Author that ever wrote either before or since. So that your perverting his Words to favour your Notion, is really, what upon second Thoughts you your self will hardly excuse. I shall first show briefly, how clearly he asserts the natural Immortality of the Soul, and then consider in how very extraordinary a manner you misrepresent him.

He approves * that Notion of *Plato*, which you † so often condemn, concerning the natural Immortality of the Soul: He declares that * *the Soul does not perish nor is dissolved, but endures for ever*: He is very large and particular in † confuting all *Lucretius's Arguments* against the natural Immortality of the Soul: He affirms, that

* *Licet verum de anima immortalitate sentiret, &c.*
lib. 7. § 8.

† *pag. 33, 66, &c.*

* *Apparet animam non interire, neq; dissolvi, sed manere in Sempiternum. lib. 7. § 9.*

* at

* Quod ex terra fuit, in Terram resolvitur; quod ex cælesti Spiritu, id constat ac viget Semper, quoniam divinus Spiritus sempiternus est. lib. 7. § 12.

† Ergo anima, quæ fragilis non est, in æternum maner; quoniam Origo ejus æterna est. ibid.

* Declaravi, ut opinor animam non esse solubilem. lib. 7. § 13.

* at Death the Body returns to the Earth; but That part of ourselves, which God breathed into us, endures and lives for ever; And again, that † the Soul is not corruptible, but endures for ever; because it proceeded from an eternal Original: And concludes; * I think, saith he, I have sufficiently proved the Soul is not dissol-

uble. He expresses himself in the very same manner concerning the natural duration of wicked Souls, as of good ones. *The Effect of that Death*, saith

* he, which wicked Souls are subject to, is not the extinguishing of them, but the punishing them eternally: This Punishment we call the second Death; which is it self also perpetual, as eternal Happiness is; The second Death, is the suffering eternal Torment; the damnation of

Souls to eternal Punishment, according to

† Sicut their Deserts. Again: As the Life of the Vita Animæ sempiternal Soul, saith † he, is eternal, in which it terna est, in qua divinos & ineloquibiles immortalitatis suæ fractus capit; ita & mors ejus perpetua sit necesse est, in qua perennes pænas & infinita tormenta pro peccatis suis pender. lib. 7. § 11.

injoys

injoys divine and unspeakable Happiness ; so its Death also must needs be eternal, in which it endures everlasting Punishment and endless Torments for its Sins. And again :

Death, saith * he, does not destroy and extinguish the Soul, but subjects it to eternal Torments. And that

* Mors autem non funditus perimit ac delet, sed æternis afficit cruciatibus. lib. 7, § 12.

all this might not possibly be understood either of your immortalizing Spirit, or of the mere Will and Pleasure of God, sustaining the Soul and causing it to endure beyond the original capacity of its own Nature ; he adds expressly in the very next Words, (as if he had foreseen and designed to prevent your Hypothesis,) that the reason why the Soul is subject to such endless Punishments, is because it was created originally immortal, and therefore cannot die : For the

Soul, * says he, cannot utterly perish and be extinguished, because it has its Original from the Spirit of God [he

† Nam interire prorsus anima non potest ; quoniam ex Dei Spiritu, qui est æternus, originem cepit. ibid.

means that which you call the πνοι Gen. 2, 7,] which is eternal. And again ; in Answer to that Objection,

* how that which is immortal, can be capable of suffering ; he has these remarkable Words : Menſ Souls, saith

* Si est immortalis Anima, quomodo patibilis inducitur & pænæ sentiens ? lib. 7, 20.

* Ejus naturæ reddi animas, ut, si non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex Deo sunt, tamen cruciabiles siant per corporis maculam, quæ peccatis iniusta sensum doloris attribuit. *ibid.*

† he, though they are not capable of being utterly extinguished, because they are of Divine Original; yet by being immersed in Sense, and depraved by Sin, they become

liable to Misery and Torment. And again:

* What wonder is it, saith he, if Souls, notwithstanding that they are immortal, are yet capable of having Punishment inflicted upon them by God?

Most of these Passages, which are as remarkably full and clear against you, as if the Author had written on purpose to oppose your Hypothesis, you inexcusably pass over without notice. And from these Passages any one may easily observe, how very grossly, I had almost said beyond Example, you misrepresent those other places which you do cite from him. The Passages which you cite, pag. 70, wherein *Lactantius* affirms *Immortality*, not to be the necessary Condition of our *Nature*, but the Reward of our *Virtue*; are all plainly meant, not of Perpetuity of Duration, (which he every where affirms to belong necessarily to our Nature) but of the eternal indestructible Happiness of Heaven; which this Author always means by the word *Immortality*, as alone deserving that glorious

Title,

* Quid ergo mirum, sicum sint immortales animæ, tamen patibiles sint Deo? *ibid.*

Title ; notwithstanding that at the same time he expressly and constantly affirms the opposite state to be of equal duration and perpetuity. Thus when, speaking of that second Death , which he says

* does not extinguish wicked Souls, but subjects them to endless Misery, he says, that That likewise is of perpetual Duration, as Immortality also is ; 'tis evident that by Immortality he means to express, not Duration, but Happiness : And in the place which you cite to prove that he did not think Immortality natural to Men, he in express words declares that by Immortality he means † the unspeakable and eternal Happiness of Heaven : And when he says * there would be no difference betwixt just and unjust, no such thing as Reward and Punishment, if all Men were born Immortal ; 'tis very evident from the Thread of his Discourse, that he means, if Men were born originally, and without undergoing any Trial, into such a State, as* the Good Angels are now in, and the Saints shall be in after the Resurrection, namely a State of Indefecti-

* Cujus non ea vis est, ut injustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pænam, secundam mortem nominamus ; quæ est & ipsa perpetua, sicut & immortalitas. lib. 2, 12.

† Ne Immortalitatem delicate assequerentur ac moliter, sed ad illud æternæ vita ineloquibile præmium summa cum difficultate, &c. lib. 7, § 5.

* Nam nihil interesset inter justum & injustum ; si quidem omnis homo natus, immortalis feret. ibid.

Thread of his
Discourse, that he means, if Men were
born originally, and without undergoing

* Cum posset semper Spiritibus suis immortalibus innumerabiles animas procreare sicut Angelos genuit, quibus Immortalitas sine ullo malorum periculo ac metu constat, &c. ibid.

ble Virtue and Happiness ; then the Nature of Rewards and Punishments, would be taken away. Again ; Those Passages which you cite pag. 71, wherein you suppose that *Lactantius* by that *immortal Spirit* which God put or inspired into an Earthly Body, means, not the *natural Soul of Man*, but the *Divine Spirit received in our Saviours regenerating Baptism*, as a new Principle of Immortality ; These Passages, I say, if to any one that pleases to compare the places, they

^{† lib. 7,} do not appear to be † all and every one
^{‡ lib. 2,} of them clearly spoken on the contrary,
^{‡ lib. 7,} concerning that *natural Soul*, which
^{4 & 5.} God is said to have breathed into Man,
Gen 2, 7 ; it will not be easie to conceive how any Man can possibly express his meaning in Words : And when from this Passage, [*Fidet corpore, spiravit ei animam de vitali fonte Spiritus sui, qui est perennis ; ut si Anima superaverit, que ex Deo oritur, sit Immortalis & in perpetua luce veretur*] you infer that the Soul is Immortal, only conditionally, if it be vigorous ; your misrepresentation of the Passage, is very extraordinary : For the Words are not one entire Sentence, as any one would imagine them to be by your manner of citing them ; but two Passages, at a Page distance from each other ; and not *Anima* (as you seem to under-

understand it) but *Homo* is the Nomina-tive Case to fit *immortalis & in perpetua Luce veretur*; And so far is the Author from making the Souls immortality *conditional*, by these Words; that directly on the contrary he in this very Sentence means to say, that the Soul must of Necessity be *Immortal* in all circumstances; only with this difference, that † if *a Man lives after the Spirit, his Immortality shall be a Happy one; but if he live after the Flesh, his Immortality must be a Miserable one.* When therefore you say, that *the way, according to Lactantius, taken by Providence, for making Mans actual Mortality or Immortality the Reward or Punishment of his Free-will was to joyn his Soul to his Body immediately, which being it self Frail and Mortal, could not secure the Soul from actual Mortality;* and That *this he supposes would make the Complex of the Soul and Body actually Mortal;* you might with the same Truth, and with as much appearance of Reason, have said, that *Lactantius wrote his Book with a design to disprove the whole Christian Religion, or any other particular Article of it whatsoever.* Again, when *Lactantius says, that*

† Ex rebus diversis ac re-pugnantibus *Homo factus est;*
— ut, si Anima superaverit,
quæ ex Deo oritur, sit immor-talis & in perpetua luce ver-setur; si autem Corpus vice-rit, — sit in tenebris semper-ternis & in Morte. Cujus [Mortis] non ea vis est, ut ini-justas animas extinguat omni-no, sed ut puniat in æternum.
lib. 2, 12.

* since

* Quia temporalem vitam temporalis mors sequitur, consequens est ut resurgent animæ ad vitam perennem, quia finem mors temporalis accepit. lib. 7. § 10.

* since this Temporal Life is succeeded by Temporal Death, it follows that the Soul must rise again to eternal Life, because temporal Death has an End;

It is a very great and palpable misrepresentation, to infer from these words, (as you do, pag. 73,) that Lactantius was so far from owning the Immortality of the Soul, as natural to it, that he seems to own its actual Death, for the space between the Death of the Body and the Resurrection; and therefore ascribes the Resurrection to the Soul as well as the Body: For what can be a grosser misrepresentation of any Author, than from one single Passage (even supposing that Passage not reconcileable with the rest,) to affirm that his Opinion was just contrary to what he largely and expressly almost in every Page of his Book declares it to be? But after all, this Passage is not difficult to be reconciled; For when he who says a hundred times in his Book, that the Soul has no dependence on the Body, but subsists as well and better after it is separated from it, says in one single Passage that Mens Souls do [resurgere] rise again to eternal Life; can anything be more evident than that his meaning is, that the Souls shall be

† united

ſ united again to their Bo- † A Deo corporibus indu-
dies at the Resurrection be- entur. lib. 7, 23. rursus carne
fore the Judgment? It is it. entur. ibid. 21.
an easie Figure, and very usual in
the best Authors, and in the Scrip-
ture it Self, to signify by the Word
[Soul] the same as [Person] in general:
Thus Gen. 46, 26, *All the Souls that
came with Jacob into Egypt, &c.* And Lev.
5, 2. *If a Soul touch any unclean thing,*
&c. In which places nothing can be
more absurd than to understand *Soul* in
the strict and proper Sense of the Word:
And yet there is just as much Reason so
to do, as, from the Paſſage now cited,
to conclude that *Lactantius*, contrary to
what he expressly declares in almost eve-
ry Page of his Book, was of Opinion
that *the Soul died with the Body*. Had
not the World deservedly an Opinion of
your great Learning, there would be no
need to take notice of such extraordi-
nary misconstructions: Which really, Sir,
in your representation of this Author,
appear to have proceeded from greater
Prejudice, or greater Want of Care,
than Men of your known Abilities are or-
dinarily guilty of. At last you come off,
pag. 75, with saying that *Lactantius's*
Reasonings either prove or are consistent
with a precarious Immortality; at least
even by our modern Reasonings, do not im-
ply

ply any Necessity of an Immortality by Nature : and who, I beseech you, ever taught any other Immortality of the Soul, than a *precarious* one ; that is, depending on the pleasure of God Almighty ? or who ever imagined, that any thing which was *γεννητόν* and had a beginning, was not also capable of Being destroyed and having an end, if God should so please ?

You begin with St *Athanasius* (Sect. 21.) very ominously ; Acknowledging that he *does indeed own the Doctrine of the Souls Immortality, as a Doctrine of the Church* : Which he does, not only in

* Οὐ δὲ καὶ αἰδανός γέροντος ἐγένετο. καὶ τότο αἴδανον εἰδένεις εὐ τῇ εκκλησίᾳ ὀδησσομένῳ. O. rat. cont. Gent.

† Τί εὐ ἀν εἴν τότο πάλιν, οὐ λύχνοις καὶ αἴδανοῖς ; ibid.

* Πᾶς ψυχὴ μᾶλλον καὶ πολλῷ τάλεον, ἀπολυθεῖσα τὸ σώματον, — φανερωτέρῃ ἔξει τὸ αἰδανοτάτην γνῶσιν ; ibid.

* the Words you cite from him, but also largely and fully in many other places of his *Oratio contra Gentes* ; styling the Soul † *rational and immortal* ; affirming that * *when it is separated from the Body, it will have a much clearer knowledge of its own Immortality* ; and proving its Immortality di-

+ Evidently, from several Topicks and Arguments : If the Soul, faith † he, be distinct from the body, — τοῦτο τὸ σῶμα ἔστι τὸ σῷμα φύσει δυνήσοντα γεννῆσαι τὸν λύχνον αἰδανοτάτον εἶναι, τῷ μὲν εἴναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα. ibid.

distinct

stinct from the Body ; as we have before shown ; and the Body is mortal ; It follows necessarily, that the Soul, being distinct from the Body, must be immortal : And again ; The Soul, saith * he, therefore meditates and thinks upon things immortal and eternal, because it is it self Immortal ; For as the Body, being it self Mortal, has all its Senses employed about mortal things ; so the Soul, whose Faculties are employed about immortal things, must it self

of necessity be immortal and live for ever : These Arguments are plainly drawn from the Nature of the Soul it self, and are directly contrary to your Notion of an Immortalizing Spirit or Will of God : And accordingly, speaking of the Heathens, he expresses himself in the very same manner concerning Their Souls in particular ; If they pretend to believe, saith † he, that they have a Soul, and value themselves upon their Rational Faculties, as they justly may ; why, as if they had no Soul, do they act contrary to Reason, and not think as they ought to do, but make God a Being meanner

* Διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ ἀδά-
βατα καὶ αἰώνια λογιζεται καὶ
φεγνοῖς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀδάβατοί
εἰσι. Καὶ ἀσπεργός σώματο-
ς εὐητὸς τυγχάνοντο, οὐντα
καὶ ἀστέρες θεωρεῖσθαι αἰδί-
στοις· εἴτες ἀδάβατα θεω-
ρεῖσθαι καὶ λογιζομένην τὸ φύ-
χλιον, ἀράγκην καὶ ἀντλία
ἀδάβατον εἶναι καὶ αἱ τε ζῆται.
ibid.

† Εἰ δὲ φύχλιον αἴτιον
[al. αὐχένον] ἔχειν, καὶ ὅπε
τὸ λογικῷ μέχε φεγνεῖσν.
εἰκότως τοῦτο ποιεῦντες· διατί
οὐκὶ ἔχοτες φύχλιον, παρεχ-
λόγουν πολιῶσι, καὶ ἐν δεῖ
φεγνεῖν φεγνεῖσν, ἀλλὰ προτί-
τονας ἔαυτες καὶ τὸ Θεῖον ποιε-
σι; Φύχλιον γὰρ ἀδάβατον φύ-
χοντες καὶ μὴ βλεπομένης αὐ-
τοῖς, τὸ δέδυ ἐν τοῖς βλεπομέ-
νοις καὶ θυητοῖς απεικόνιζεται. ibid.

than themselves? For having themselves an immortal and invisible Soul, yet they make God like to things visible and mortal. When therefore to Athanasius's general Assertion concerning the *Immortality of the Soul*, you answer, that That does not concern your Cause, because your Question is not whether the Soul be *Immortal*, but whether it be *Immortal in its own Nature*; you are guilty of a very great Fallacy: For if by the Souls being *Immortal in its own Nature*, you intend to express what we mean, that the Soul by the powers given it at its first Creation is naturally able to continue for ever; then Athanasius's Assertion does concern your Cause; because, in all the places now cited, he expressly maintains the *natural Immortality* of the Soul in that Sense: But if by *Immortal in its own Natnre*, you mean necessarily *Immortal*, as God is; then neither Athanasius, nor we, nor perhaps any Body else, ever meant that the Soul was *Immortal in its own Nature*.

From the Passages therefore now cited, wherein Athanasius so expressly and very largely asserts the *natural Immortality* of the Soul, 'tis very reasonable to conclude, that all those Passages in His Book *de Incarnatione verbi Dei*, which you understand to imply a *natural Mortali-*

ty of the Soul, ought (that they may not be inconsistent with what he so fully and expressly asserts elsewhere,) to be understood concerning that natural Mortality which is the Dissolution of the Body and Separation of the Soul, without determining what becomes of the Soul after that Separation. And those Passages may the better be understood in that Sense, because they are all spoken concerning that Mortality *Adam* incurred by his Sin in Paradice ; the Consequence of which Mortality, with respect to the State of the Soul separated thereby from the Body, antecedent to the Promise of Christ, was not a Question necessary to be entered into. And this is still the more confirmed by This, that even those Phrases, *avaris regniorum*, *odysseis megalophon*, *et in re avaris odyssej ubi* and the like ; which seems at first sight to make the most for your purpose ; 'tis plain need not be understood to express the total Extinction or utter Annihilation of *Adam*, if Christ had never been promised ; but either his having no ground to expect any Restoration to his former state by a Resurrection of the Body ; which seems to be the meaning of them in some places ; or else (which is evidently their Signification in some other places,) Death's continuing to prevail and extend it self over

bis Posterity : Thus, When Adam had sinned, saith * he, Death entered into the World; and this Destruction prevailed more and more over the whole Race of Mankind. For Men increased and multiplied their Sins beyond measure: And therefore Death prevailing more and more, and this Destruction continuing to have Dominion over Men, the whole Race of Mankind was lost.

* Τέτο ὃ κανοῦμεν, διὰ μὴρ ἀνθρώπων απέθυνσκου, οὐτὶς φθορὴ λοιπὸν κατ' αὐτῶν πάκιασεν, καὶ τλεῖον τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσχυρον καθ' ὅλη τὴν γένεσ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλημμυλησισιν οἱ ανθρώπωις καὶ ἄχρις ὥρων ὁμοιώσαν εἰσήκεισαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ὅλη γον ἐπικλεισθύμοις, λοιπὸν καὶ ἐις ἀμετρον ἐληλύθασι. — Διὰ δὲ ταῦτα πλεῖον τῷ Σανάτῳ κρεπτίσαιτο, καὶ τὸ φθορῆς παρεμβάνεσσιν καὶ τὴν ανθρώπων, τὸ μὴρ τὸ ανθρώπων γένος ἐφθάσετο. *De Incarnat. Verbi.*

The same thing (namely that the Phrases before-mentioned do not signify the total extinction of *Adam* both Soul and Body, if Christ had never been promised; but only That Mortality which is the Dissolution of the Body and separation of the Soul;) may also be gathered from those other Expressions of the same Author in his Book *de Incarnatione Christi*, from some of which you very unreasonably endeavour (pag. 85.) to conclude the direct contrary. For when he speaks of the Souls being held [*ἐν δεσμοῖς*] in Bonds, and [*ἐν δεσμοῖς θανάτῳ*] in the Bonds of Death; 'tis plain this does not signify the Extinction of the Soul, but its confinement to [*Ἄδην*] the separate State. And therefore, speaking of Christ's delivering

livering Men from that Mortality which was the Consequence of Adam's Sin, he saith; * *To that place where the Body of Man was corrupted, thither did the Body of Christ go; and to that Place, where the Soul of Man was detained in Death, thither did Christ go with his Humane Soul, &c.* In which

Passage 'tis evident, that by the Words [κατεῖπεν ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπινη ἐν θάνατῳ] the Soul of Man was detained in Death, is not meant the Extinction of the Soul, but its Confinement to [“Adūs] that Separate State, to which the Soul of Christ descended. And in that very Passage, where from the Souls being concerned in the Sentence [θάνατῷ ἀποδανῆ] thou shalt surely die, you would infer the Extinction of the Soul; if you had cited the Words at length, it would have appeared that just the contrary was intended: The Words are these; God, saith he, passed upon Man a double Sentence of Punishment; saying to his earthly Body, Dust thou art, and unto Dust shalt thou return; and so the Body turned into corruption; And to his Soul, Thou shalt surely die; and so the Man

* Διὸ τέτοιο καὶ ὅπερ διεφέρει τὸ τοῦ αὐθεωπίου σῶμα, ἐκεῖ περιετεῖται Ἰησοῦς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα· Καὶ ὅπερ κακοφάτητο ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ αὐθεωπίνη ἐν θανάτῳ, ἐκεῖ σπλεγχνύεται ὁ Χειρὸς τῶν αὐθεωπίνων ψυχὴν οὐανεῖσαν, &c. De Incarn. Christi contra Apollinar. lib. i.

† Διπλῶς τὸ πικρεῖσμα τῶν ἀπόφασιν δέδεικε τὸ μὲν γνήσιον εἰρηνικὸν, Γὰρ εἰ, καὶ εἰς γῆν ἀπελθεῖσῃ καὶ ἐπας, υποδέξεται φέρει τὸ σῶμα, δεσπότης ἀποφνιναμένος. Τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν, θάνατῷ ἀποδανῆ, καὶ ἐπας μὴ ψυχὴν διατείπεται ὁ αὐθεωπίς, καὶ ἐν δυσὶ τόποις ἀποθανεῖσεται. ibid.

was

was separated, and condemned to depart into two different places : From the last of which Words it is very evident, that by applying that Threatning [σαράντα ἀποδινόν] thou shalt surely die, to the Soul ; he did not mean its Extinction, but its Separation and Confinement to [Ἄδης] the separate State.

Your last citation out of this Author, (pag. 86,) is very remarkable. Against certain Hereticks who taught that the Soul was corporeal, he argues from those Words of our Saviour, Fear not them that kill the Body, but cannot kill the Soul.

* Πῶς εἰ σαρκικὴ ἡ τύχη,
καθ' ὑμᾶς, καὶ σωθίσκεται
σάματος συμφέρεται; πῶς
ὢ καὶ ὁ Πέτρος τὰς εὐ"Αδην"
πατεργάδες τύχεις, πνευ-
ματικὸς σοροῦσας, &c. De
adventu Christi contra Apol-
linar. libe. 2.

If, saith* he, the Soul be, as you Appollinarists contend, corporeal ; why can it be killed and perish with the Body ? and why doth St Peter, speaking of separate Souls, call them Spirits ? Here you

say, the [σαρκικὴ τύχη] fleshly or corporeal Soul, is plainly opposed to the [πνευματικὴ] Spiritual Soul, and for that reason is supposed as capable of being killed by Men, as the Body it self. Is not this very extraordinary ? when the plain and express meaning of Athanasius, is to show that there can be no such thing at all as [σαρκικὴ τύχη] a fleshly or corporeal Soul ; because, if there was, it would be capable of being killed

ied, which our Saviour says cannot be.

All that you say, Sect. 23, seems to be utterly Unintelligible : And those words in particular, pag. 91, (which I have before had an occasion to take notice of,) where you suppose the Soul to be *Something distinct both from Spirit, and also from Matter and Motion* ; that is to say, a *Material Form* ; an *active Substantial Principle, distinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter in esse, in fieri, in operari, and which must accordingly be dissolved on the dissolution of that Matter on which it depends* : These words, I say, appear so very absurd and contradictory in themselves, that no Confutation of them can be stronger than the bare transcribing them.

You seem very certain, Sect. 24, that your Doctrine can have no ill Influence upon Mens present Practise ; because, tho' you assert indeed the *natural Mortality* of the Soul, yet you teach at the same time, that the Souls of all those, who hear of the Gospel, whether they imbrace it or no, shall be *actually immortalized* ; and so bad Men can take no advantage of the Doctrine concerning the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul, to encourage

courage themselves in their Wickedness with the Hopes of Impunity. But can you really think, Sir, that it is a thing of no ill consequence in Practise, to raise new disputes, to fill the Minds of weak and unstable Men with endless Doubts and Scruples, and the Mouths of the profane with new Topicks of Scepticism and Raillery, against the most important and fundamental Doctrines of all Religion? Or can you be indeed perswaded, that such Men as are pleased with some of your Notions, will as readily admit all the rest also? You are forced to make a new and distinct Hypothesis upon every particular occasion: You first suppose the Soul of Man naturally Mortal; and then, to secure to good Men the Unchangeable State of Heaven, you are forced to suppose *their* Souls præternaturally immortalized to Happiness by the Divine Spirit: Yet, because all who receive that Divine Spirit, do not so behave themselves as to be capable of the Happiness of Heaven, you are forced (though † unwillingly) to suppose some of them immortalized by the same Divine Spirit to Punishment; And after this, least those who reject the Gospel and never receive the Divine immortalizing Spirit at all, should take advantage of the Souls natural Mortality to encourage

† Premon.
pag. 22,
compared
with your
Discourse
pag. 8 &
31:

courage themselves with hopes of Impunity in their Wickedness, you are forced to suppose *Their Souls* made immortal without any immortalizing Principal at all, by the mere Omnipotence and Arbitrary Pleasure of God. Now, all these Hypotheses appearing very precarious and independent on each other ; is it not very obvious to perceive that profane Men will very gladly and with great advantage make use of all your Arguments for the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul ; and drop the following parts of your Hypothesis ? And indeed I cannot see, but you must in some measure be answerable for this ill Consequence. For it is not enough to prevent the natural and obvious ill consequences of an Hypothesis, that a learned and ingenious Man is able to invent such further Suppositions, and to find out such Shifts and Distinctions, by which he shall think he can evade the force of those Consequences. There is hardly any Opinion so extravagant or of so mischievous consequence, but an ingenious Man may maintain it in such manner, as that upon his whole Hypothesis it shall not be easie to charge him with any ill consequence, for which he will not be able to find some evasion : And yet he that maintains it, must nevertheless be answerable for such ill Con-

I sequences,

sequences, as are naturally apt to follow from the Opinion it self, without the additional Hypothesis which are made use of to salve it. The Epicureans, who taught that *Pleasure was the Chief Good*, when they were charged with the obvious ill Consequences of that Doctrine, were provided to make such ingenious Explications of it, that they thought themselves abundantly able to evade all those ill Consequences that could be drawn from it : Yet that Doctrine was evidently a very pernicious Doctrine ; and they who maintained it, could not be excused (as Cicero has largely shown) from being answerable for those Consequences,

[†] Quasi ego id curem
quid ille aiat aut neget : il-
lud quero, quid ei *consentaneum* sit dicere, qui &c. Ci-
cero.

which were but † too naturally drawn from it by the generality of Men, who would not attend to the Subtilties and Distinctions of those Philosophers.

He that will suppose Men to have *no Soul at all*, but that their Life is entirely extinguished at the Dissolution of the Body ; and at the same time supposes that at the Resurrection their Life shall be restored again, and continue for ever ; will be sure to pretend that no ill Consequence can be drawn from his Doctrine, because he supposes Men actually and in event as much Immortal, as if they *had Souls really*

ly distinct from their Bodies : And yet I believe you your self make no doubt but That Opinion is a very pernicious one. He that will affirm that there is no other Substance in the World but *Matter* ; and at the same time supposes Matter capable of all the same Powers and Attributes, which we ascribe to *Spirit* ; may likewise with the same Reason pretend, that no ill Consequence can be drawn from his Opinion : And yet no Body can doubt but such an Opinion leads directly to Atheism. 'Tis not therefore so very clear, as you seem to suppose it to be, that none of those Consequences are to be charged upon you, which (if your whole Hypothesis be granted) you can find indeed a way of evading.

You attempt to prove (Sect. 25) that the Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no Ingredient in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themselves; by saying, that the popular Heathens believed only their first Ancestors to have been Gods, their next to have been Heroes or Demi-Gods, and the later Generations to have been pure Men ; Unless the Supreme Being were pleased (even in the degenerate Ages) to confer the nobler Principle on some choice Favourites. Here you seem to forget, that the popular Heathens

(as you call them) had all a notion of *Elysian Fields* and of a *Tartarus*, that is, of a Place of future Happiness or Misery, where the Souls of those which you call *pure* or mere *Men* were to be disposed of, either to continue there for ever, or to come out upon new revolutions, but not to be extinguished. Yet presently after, (pag. 96) you say that by the oldest Tradition, *all Souls* were *supposed to have the Divine Principle con-natural to them*; And the rest of the Section is wholly spent in explaining the Notions of those whom you call (pag. 100) the *Traditional travelling Philosophers*, who believed that Human Souls underwent many Purgations and different Revolutions, but that *no part of the divine seed might perish finally*; and that *all Humane Souls were thus far at least of a divine extraction, not as the Notion of the Divine might intitle them to infinite Perfection, but as it might at least intitle them to Immortality*. All which is so far from being any thing to your purpose, of proving that the *Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no ingredient, in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themselves*; that on the contrary it seems to me to prove rather directly against you.

Sect. 26, You all along confound either necessary Immortality, or else the Notion of Præ-existence and Revolutions of Souls, with *natural Mortality*. That which any of the Primitive Christians blamed *Plato* and *Origen* for, was not their asserting the *Immortality* of the Soul, but its *Præ-existence* and everlasting *Revolutions*. Their Maxim, that whatever had a Beginning, must therefore be capable likewise of having an End, does not at all prove against *natural*, but only against *necessary Immortality*, that is, *necessary and independent Existence*: As is evident from what you your self observe, that upon this Principle they owned none Immortal but God himself; No, not the Angels; And that the Apostle affirms of God, [‘Οὐόντες οὐασι, I Tim. 6, 16,] that He only has Immortality, as being the αὐτοδοκεῖα from whom All that will pretend to Immortality, must derive it, and not from their own Nature; that is, not from the Necessity of their own Nature, but from the Will of God, who was pleased to create them Immortal, and upon whom (notwithstanding their Immortality, that is, notwithstanding their natural Power of continuing for ever, without being liable to be destroyed by any created Force,) they nevertheless continually depend for their Preservation.

Ari-

Aristotle by affirming the immortal Soul to be [θυετὴ] from without, means plainly that it is *Something distinct from the Body*, and not (as you interpret him pag. 101.) that it is *not ingredient in the Constitution of Mankind in general*, or (as you † elsewhere express your self) that it is a *præternatural Principle*; as if, *naturally*, Men had no rational Souls at all.

† Pre-
mon. pag.
24, and
Discourse
pag. 300.

The other Maxim you mention, *That nothing that is possible can be Immortal*, proves likewise only against *necessary*, not against *natural Immortality*. For a thing's being capable to be acted upon, does not at all prove that it is capable of being destroyed by any natural Power. Every perfectly solid Particle of Matter it self, is incapable of being destroyed or even divided by any Power of Nature, though it is as capable of being moved and agitated and acted upon, as any compound Body. The Soul may in like manner be very capable of suffering and of being acted upon; and yet it will not at all follow, that it is capable of being destroyed by any natural Power. Those of the Antients, who *proved that the Soul of the rich Man in the Parable, must have been Corruptible, because it suffered Torment*; you acknowledge prove at the same time that it *must likewise have been*

been Corporeal : But the Corporality of the Soul, you know, was taught only by one or two Men. The rest were all of a different Opinion. And *Lactantius* is very particular and express in answering that Objection ; † If the Soul be

immortal, how then is it passible and capable of enduring Punishment ? and if it be cap-

able of pain, how is it not capable of Diffo-

lution ? The Answer he gives, is ; first,

* that (according to the Noti-
tion of the Stoicks) the Souls
of Men, though by reason of
their Divine Original they
cannot indeed be extinguished,
yet by being immersed in Sense

* Ejus naturæ reddi ani-
mas, ut si non extingubiles
in totum, quoniam ex Deo
sunt, tamen cruciabiles fiant
per corporis maculam, &c.
ibid.

and depraved by Sin, they may become li-
able to Misery and Punishment ; Secondly,

† that though we indeed do
not know how Immaterial
Things can be acted upon, yet
God has as much Power over
them, as over corporeal things :

And lastly, * that in order
to endure Punishment, the
Souls shall again be united to
their Bodies. All which
Passages undeniably show
that *Lactantius* did not
think the Soul naturally cor-
ruptible; and preserved præ-

† Tantam esse Dei pote-
statem, ut etiam incorpora-
liæ comprehendat, &c, quemadmodum voluerit, afficiat.
Nam & Angeli Deum meru-
unt, &c. Quid ergo mirum,
si cum sint immortales ani-
mæ, tamen patibiles sint Deo?
ibid. § 21.

* Sed tamen docent nos
sanctæ literæ, quemadmodum pœnas impii sint laturi.
Nam quia peccata in corpo-
ribus contraxerunt, rursus
carne induentur, ut in corpo-
ribus piaculum solvant.
ibid.

ternaturally

ternaturally by the Power of God ; but, on the contrary, that the Soul was naturally Immortal, but by the Power of God made capable of enduring Punishment.

If there was any strength in the Argument you make use of, Sect. 27 ; that because the actual *Immortality of the Soul is a Revelation of the Gospel, therefore it is not capable of being proved by Reason from the Nature of the Soul it self* ; It would follow by the same Argument, that *Moral Obligations*, because they are *Revelations of the Will of God in the Gospel*, therefore are not capable of being proved by Reason, from the Nature of God, of Men, and of Things. Some things revealed in the Gospel, are indeed of such a Nature, that they could not have been known *at all* without Revelation : But Others (of which the *Immortality of the Soul* is one,) are such as were capable of being in great measure discovered by the Light of Nature and right Reason ; but yet by the Revelation of the Gospel, are made known with much greater *Certainty*, greater *Clearness*, greater *Authority*, and in a *Manner* much better fitted to all *Capacities*. This seems to be the proper meaning of the Word [επιστατο] 2 Tim. 1,

to, has brought to Light, has clearly discovered, has universally and evidently made known, that which before was but obscurely and difficultly and imperfectly understood. The Allusion you suppose to be between the Words, [has brought Life and Immortality to Light through the Gospel,] and those other words of the Apostle, [an Inheritance incorruptible, that fadeth not away, of the Saints in Light,] is indeed some little Similitude of Words ; the word *Light* being used in both places ; but not the least Allusion or Similitude in Sense. And indeed you seem your self to be conscious of the weakness of your Argument in this whole Matter ; by your saying that the Immortality of the Soul, *at least* † ^{pag. 106.} in Heaven, is plainly supposed not to be known without divine Revelation ; and again, *At least* * as to the giving us that * ^{pag. 104.} immortal Life in Heaven ; and, That the Immortality of the Soul could not have been otherwise known with † that † ^{pag. 106.} Certainty that might support the Practise which Religion expects in consequence of it ; and again, That it could not have been known, *at least* * with that Assurance * ^{pag. 104.} which was requisite for the Practise which Religion requires pursuant to the Belief of it.

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That

That the Sadducees (Sect. 28,) denied the *Immortality of the Soul*, is very true; But then it is worth observing, that the same Men asserted also that there was no *Resurrection*, neither *Angel nor Spirit*, Acts 23, 6 Your interpretation of which words, is very extraordinary. What is the meaning of *Spirit here, as it is joyned with Angel*, you say is manifest: It is that Immortalizing *Spirit which makes us Immortals, that is, Immortal and entitled to Heaven*, as well as the Angels are: That same *Spirit indeed, by which the Angels themselves are entitled to Immortality*. — This therefore oblig'd them [the Sadducees] to deny the actual Immortalizing of either Angels or Humane Souls, when they denied them Both that *Spirit which could alone immortalize them*. These Words, I think, need no Reflexion to be made upon them.

Your Interpretation (Sect. 31,) of that Text, 1 Cor. 15, 22, *As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive;* seems very forced and unnatural. You understand it to signify, that as All who descended from *Adam*, must die; so All who are in *Christ*, that is, all Christians, shall be made alive. But this Interpretation, if it was true, would prove

too

too much for you ; namely, that those only who embraced, not those who rejected the Gospel, should be raised again : And the general tenor of Scripture, which every where declares that Unbelievers, who never were *in Christ*, shall be raised to Condemnation ; shows plainly that your Interpretation of this Text is wrong. And how the false Notion certain Hereticks had of a metaphorical Resurrection, 2 Tim. 2, 18, tends to prove that St Pauls true account of the literal Resurrection, is to be understood in a particular and limited Sense ; is not easie to conceive.

Your Inference in the same place, against the Universality of the Resurrection, from what the Apostle says concerning *Baptism* ; seems likewise wholly precarious. For the Apostle does not in this Chapter say any thing, by which he might seem to ground the Resurrection upon *Baptism* : But only, arguing against those who pretended to be Christians, and yet did not believe the Resurrection of the Dead, he shows how absurd it was for such Persons to be *baptized*, and thereby to expose themselves to such hazards as they must unavoidably do by their professing Christianity, if they had no expectation of a

Resurrection from the Dead. Whatever be the meaning of that difficult Phrase, of being *baptized for the Dead*; the stress of the Argument plainly lies upon these Words. *And why stand we in Jeopardy every Hour?* That *Baptism*, whatever it was, exposed them to some hazard, and gave occasion to their being persecuted; and the Apostles Argument is, that it was foolish for them to expose themselves to such danger needlessly and to no purpose, if there was to be no such thing as a Resurrection from the Dead. The Apostle grounds the reasonableness of being baptized, and of embracing Christianity, which was a persecuted Religion; purely upon the Hopes of a Resurrection from the Dead; But he does not at all ground the Resurrection upon Baptism, nor says any thing which does in the least insinuate that the Resurrection should not be universal.

The Conclusion you draw (Sect. 32.) from what St *Paul* teaches, *Rom. 5.* is very obscure. The Sum of the Apostles Doctrine, there, is that That Condemnation which was brought upon Men by *Adam*, they are delivered from by Christ. How you can infer any thing from thence, against the universal Immortality of the Soul,

Soul, I do not preceive. You suppose that those over whom Death reigned between the times of *Adam* and *Moses*, were extinguished by a total Mortality both of Soul and Body ; But the Death there spoken of is plainly the same Death to which all other Men likewise are subject : For 'tis not said, that Death reigned over *Them only* ; but that Death reigned *even* over them also, as well as over the rest of Mankind ; notwithstanding that they had not sinned against any positive Law, as *Adam before*, and those who lived under the Law did *after* ; but were subject to Death, only as it was a natural Consequence of *Adam's Transgression* : To infer from hence, that their Souls as well as Bodies, were subject to that Mortality, is begging the Question which was undertaken to be proved. Those who are subject to Death, in consequence of *Adam's Transgression*, are indeed stiled *Many*. ver. 15 and 19 ; as those to whom the Benefit of Christ's Death redounds, are also in the same place stiled *Many* : But those *Many* who die thro' the Offence of One, are, ver. 12 and 18, expressly called *All Men* ; and there is no good reason to suppose, but that the Death of Christ, who was promised immediately upon

the

the Fall of *Adam*, may conditionally extend its Virtue, and Benefit under different Dispensations, to all Men likewise. To say that the Dominion of Death, signifies in this place something peculiar, under which *all men are not included*; because the Apostle affirms that *Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's Transgressions*; is very singular and groundless: For the Dominion of Death is not there *confined* (as you suppose it) *to the space between Adam and Moses*; so as to signify a particular kind of Death prevailing at that Time, an extinction of Soul as well as dissolution of the Body; But the Apostles assertion is plainly This, that in Consequence of *Adam's Transgression*, Death (in the common acceptation of Mortality) reigned in that space of time also, even over them that had not transgressed any positive Law *after the similitude of Adam's Transgression*, as well as over those who had in their own Persons disobeyed positive Laws. From whence how any thing can be collected to *your purpose*, is very difficult to imagine.

Whether that Text, *Joh. 3, 9, That was the true Light, which lighteth every Man,*

Man that cometh into the World ; was ever alledged by Any, to prove that an Immortalizing Spirit is given to every Particular by Christ himself ; I cannot tell. But I think your Interpretation of it, (Sect. 33,) is utterly unintelligible. The ~~word~~, you † say, is That which our Apostle † pag. 136, here makes in all Men, [in every Man that cometh into the World,] inlightned by the visitation of the Λόγος, as an external Principle : Yet so as not to make any change in the Nature, in the Person so inlightned, without peculiar divine Favour, and dispositions in the recipient, for such an Union with the Λόγος, as may qualify it for the divine Favour of raising it above its own Nature : Till then, they are separable again, and this external Visitation of the Λόγος, leaves the visited ψυχὴ, as Mortal as it found it, where there is no particular design of God for Immortalizing it to Punishment. What the meaning of this, and all that follows in that Section, is ; and how you collect it from the fore-cited Text of St John ; is not, I believe, possible to be understood.

When St Paul says, i Thess. 4, 16, that the dead in Christ shall rise first ; These words do not indeed prove that there must afterwards be a Resurrection of them

them that never heard of Christ : because the *dead in Christ*, which are here said to *rise first*, are not, 'tis true, opposed in this place to the dead *out of Christ*, but to them that shall be found *alive in Christ* at the time of the Judgment : (Where note by the by, that you † misinterpret this Text, by opposing the *dead in Christ*, and which are said to *rise first*, not, as the Apostle does, to them that shall be found *alive in Christ*, *but to those who had been formerly in Christ and did not die in him, or to those who might have been in him if they had pleased, but never were in him actually.*) But other places of Scripture, as has been before shown, do sufficiently prove the Universality of the Resurrection : And particularly that parallel Text, *1 Cor. 15, 23* ; where the same Apostle says, that *every Man* shall be raised *in his own Order* ; *Christ the First-fruits, afterwards they that are Christs at his coming* ; And then *cometh the end, &c.* Which words being immediately subjoined to that universal declaration, *As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive* ; cannot, without great force, be interpreted to any other Sense, but that *the End* must signifie the general Resurrection of all the Dead. See *Rev. 20, v. 5. 12 & 13.*

Your

Your Interpretation (Sect. 35.) of that Text, Rom. 2, 12, *As many as have sinned without Law, shall also perish without Law, and as many as have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by the Law;* is not only groundless; the word [*ἀπολεῖται* shall perish] which you understand to signify *Annihilation* or *bear ceasing to be*, being evidently Synonymous to [*κρίθησθαι* shall be judged;] But also (as I before observed upon your *Præmonition*, Sect 6,) you thereby overthrow all the Threatnings of the Gospel, which frequently express the Punishment even of the worst of Sinners by that same word [*ἀπολεῖται* shall perish] which you here interpret to signify only *a bare ceasing to be*. You are your self sensible of this difficulty, pag. 143; where you confess, that *though the word, Perish, may bear that milder Sense of only ceasing to be, yet it is also used in the Scriptures, concerning them whom all must believe liable to the severest positive Inflections.* You seem indeed sensible, I say, of this difficulty upon your Interpretation: But yet you give no answer to it: Only you say, pag. 144, that *though the word will indeed bear a larger Signification, yet in this place Annihilation may perhaps be more natural.* Is not this a very singular manner of arguing? To

^{† See Pre- mon. pag. 35.} † collect from the signification of the word *ἀπλεύται*, that those of whom it is here spoken, shall only cease to be ; and yet at the same time to confess that in other places of Scripture That word has no such Signification ; only *in this place, Annihilation may, perhaps, be more natural.*

Your Interpretation of those other words of the Apostle, that *when the Gentiles which have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves* ; is no less extraordinary ; Namely, that the Gentiles being a *Law unto themselves*, does not signify their Obligation to obey the Law of nature, with respect to future Rewards and Punishments ; but only there * *owning the Reasonableness of the things imposed as a Law by God on the Jews, but not on themselves ; which would no further oblige Them to the Observation of them, than as their own Interests might prevail with them to observe them, as they would avoid the Punishments and obtain the Rewards of Providence in This Life.* Is not this very wonderful ; that the Gentiles should be able to judge of the *Reasonableness of Gods moral Law to the Jews, and yet not be sensible that the Reasonableness of the Thing laid*

* pag. 144.

laid a strong Obligation upon themselves also ? Or that they should be sensible of an Obligation laid upon them to live virtuously (which it would sometimes happen they could not do without exposing even their Life it self,) and yet not have any ground to expect a future Judgment, nor any other Rewards and Punishments than in the present Life ? Is not this, destroying the very Nature of Virtue and Vice ; and contrary to some of your own Arguments, *Sect. 47, and elsewhere ?*

It is not a very consistent Notion, to suppose as you do, (*Sect. 35, 36, and elsewhere,*) that the Souls of Men, though naturally mortal, yet are neither dissolved with their Bodies, nor yet perish afterwards by any natural Decay ; but survive, and continue to subsist in a separate State ; and none of them ever perish actually by that decay and Mortality which you suppose natural to Them ; but that those who shall neither be immortalized to Happiness nor to Punishment, shall yet subsist till the general Judgment, and then be dissolved by that exquisite fire which is to prevail in the last Conflagration, at least so far as to deprive them of any sensibility of Pain. Is not

this Notion more properly a supposing them to be naturally Immortal, that is, capable of subsisting for ever by the Powers given them at their original Production ; but that God, by the interposition of his Almighty Power, præternaturally destroys at the last day, such of them as are neither capable of eternal Happiness, nor yet deserve eternal Punishment ? This certainly would have been rather the more consistent Scheme of the two, and somewhat a more defensible Explication of your Notion, (with respect to the *bare Reason* of the Thing,) than to affirm that all Souls are *naturally mortal*, and yet that none of them ever die by a *natural decay and Mortality*. But your Hypothesis, however varied, would not yet have been truly consistent. For why, I beseech you, must it needs be supposed, that God cannot dispose of all his rational Creatures into States suitable to their several Natures, and proportionable to their several capacities and deserts, without destroying and taking away their Being ? And what can be more forced and disagreeable to Reason, than to suppose that the Sodomites and Ninevites and other Heathens of all Sorts, must indeed all appear at the Day of Judg-

Judgment, but yet that their appearance there will be * with no Design of * pag. 148.
concerning them in the Judgment of the Day, but only in the retrospective part of the day, for vindicating the Divine Providence, in relation to what had been transacted by it formerly ? You imagine indeed, † that the Sodomites and Egyptians and other wicked Men to whom the Gospel was never preached, may endure the Sufferings of the future eternal State, during the time of their Duration ; that is, from the time of their Death to the Day of Judgment ; And that * * pag. 311⁷ the Infelicities good Heathens may have suffered in this Life, may be sufficiently rewarded by the Happiness of the intermediate space between their Death and the Judgment, though they have no share in those Eternal Rewards which are to follow after the day of Judgment : But, upon your Scheme, how can this be applied to those who shall live at the End of the World, when there may be as good and as bad Men among the Heathens, as ever were in any other Age, and yet these, according to your Notion, must All perish together at the Conflagration ? And besides, because I presume you will not be less moved by Authority than by Reason ; is

is not this extremely like one of those very Notions, which *Tertullian*, whose Authority you are otherwise so very desirous

* Qui animæ aliquod tempus indulgent, ab excessu usq; in conflagrationem universitatis, ut Stoici, &c. *Tertull. de Anima.*

Τὴν δὲ τυχὴν θυντῶν τε καὶ φθαρτῶν. Οὐκ ἐνδύεται τὸ σώματος ἀπαλλαγῆσαν φθείρεσθαι. Ἀλλ' ἐπιμέρουν πνάσ χεργας καθ' ἔαυτην. τὴν μὲν οὖν σπελαῖων, μέχρι τούτων πνὸς ἀναλύσασ τὴν πάντων &c. *Numenius apud Euseb.*

+ Quis autem illis postumæ Eruditionis usus ac fructus, jamjam conflagratione peritarris? *Tertull. de Anima.*

to make use of, blames the * Stoicks for, and ridicules them as vainly and † needlessly imagining, that the Souls of their Disciples should continue capable of Instruction and Improvement in the separate State, when at the same time they believed they were all to perish in the approaching Conflagration?

What you advance in your 41st and following Sections, concerning the State and Condition of separate Souls, is in every respect too uncertain to have any thing built upon it. Whether they who never heard of the Gospel in This Life, shall hereafter have any new Offer made to them, and undergo any new Trial; or whether all Mankind, even those who never hear of Christ at all, shall however, by virtue of the original Promise of the Messiah made to *Adam*, have so much benefit of the Redemption purchased by the Blood of Christ, as that at the

the general Judgment they shall all in some Proportions, and according to their several Capacities, have relief from the Equity and Mercy of the Gospel-covenant ; (which seems, of the two, to be much the more probable Opinion : For how shall they who are found alive at the end of the World, undergo any new Trial ?) Which soever, I say, of these ways be true, it makes little difference as to the main Question. That, upon the whole, God is no Respecter of Persons ; and *that our Saviour could not confine his design, as a Saviour of Souls,* to any particular people, (as you prove largely and well in your 47th Section,) but will certainly in some manner or other extend the Offer of his gracious Covenant, or at least the Benefit and Equity of it in some Proportions, to Men of all Ages and Nations in the World ; must undoubtedly be allowed by all considering Persons : And this very consideration alone, if you had not at other times reasoned inconsistently with your self, might easily have saved you the whole trouble of inventing your wonderful Hypothesis concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul, in order to dispose of those Gentiles who never heard of Christ : But than as to the particular

particular Manner, how the Equity and Mercy of the Gospel shall be extended to those to whom it never was preached ; this, there is no Necessity of determining ; And certainly your Notion, (Sect. 42,) concerning separate Souls being of Necessity to be *baptized with Water*, even in the *literal Sense*, in order to be made capable of any Favour of this kind ; might very well have been spared.

As to what you teach in the 42th and following Sections, concerning *two distinct Souls* in Men ; Many antient Writers do indeed so express themselves, as if they supposed the *sensitive Soul* to be one Substance, and the *rational Soul* another : But both That Philosophy it self, and your explication of it particularly, is very unintelligible : And your interpretation of that Text, where the Formation of Man is described, is really ridiculous ; The Words are these ; *And the Lord God formed Man of the Dust of the Ground, and breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul*, Gen.

^{† pag. 216.} 2, 7. Upon this Text, you † say ; *Here is a Man supposed before the Divine Breathing ; Certainly not a dead Man, which is indeed no Man, but a Man animated with that*

that lower Soul, which is common to him and Beasts, and therefore cannot be imputed to a Divine Breathing. Can any thing be more absurd than this Interpretation? or can any thing be more plain, than that the meaning of these Words is, that God first formed the *Body* of Man out of the Dust, and then inspired into it a living *Soul*? But which way soever the Philosophy of this Question be determined, it will still be nothing to your purpose: For suppose, if you please, that the *Sensitive* and *rational* Soul be really two distinct Substances; yet how does this tend to prove that the *Rational Soul* is ever the more *naturally Mortal*? Did not those antient Philosophers, who thought Man composed of three distinct parts, a *Body*, a *sensitive Soul*, and a *rational Spirit*; teach that the *rational Spirit* was *naturally Immortal*? as you your self confess † concerning *Plato* and *Philo*; and you + ^{pag. 22} bring no Authority nor Reasoning, in & 23. these Sections, to the contrary.

In like manner your long Excursion, in the 55th Section, concerning the *Separate State*, does not at all prove, nor indeed so much as suppose, that the Soul is *naturally Mortal*: On the contrary, the Authorities you there cite, do all suppose it *Immortal*. Wherefore the particular

M groundless,

groundless, not to say absurd Notions, which you there advance, concerning the *Habitations of separate Souls*, and the *Extent of the Power of Evil Spirits over them*, &c; not being of any importance with respect to the main Question; need not here be examined.

The Argument you propose, (Sect. 60.) that *a naturally mortal Soul is more suitable and agreeable to be joyned with a naturally mortal Body, as a constituent of Human Nature, than a Soul that is naturally Immortal.* This Argument, if it proved any thing, would prove that the Soul ought to be of the same Nature and Duration with the Body, and that it ought to die at the same time with the Body, that is, that there ought to be no Soul at all. For it is just as much disagreeable and unsuitable to the Body, to have such a Substance united to it, as is capable of subsisting at all after the Dissolution of the Body; as to have such a Substance united to it, as is capable of continuing to subsist for ever. Since therefore you your self acknowledge that the Soul is naturally able to subsist separate for many ages after the dissolution of the Body; this Argument, if it had any strength in it, would prove a great deal

deal too much for you ; and be of the same force against *your own* Notion of the Soul, as against *ours* ; Unless you could perswade the World to believe, that not only the *Immortalizing Spirit*, but even the *rational Soul*, that Soul which you suppose to be *naturally Mortal*, is it self also a *præternatural Principle*, (as you * * *Præmon.*
once or twice very absurdly assert,) and *p. 24. and Discours.*
not originally a constituent Part of Hu- *p. 300.*
mane Nature.

Neither has the Argument you draw from the Doctrine of *Original Sin*, any greater strength in it. For there is no necessity of supposing, upon any Scheme, that such Persons as have no actual Sin of their own, shall ever be condemned to eternal Torments merely for the Sin of our first Parent. 'Tis true we cannot peremptorily affirm in particular, how God will dispose of such Souls, as having no actual Sins of their own to answer for, yet have no express Title, by the ordinary Means, to the Rewards of the Gospel : But certainly 'tis a very weak and poor Argument, to conclude that numberless Souls must therefore necessarily be annihilated, merely because we do not know in particular, what State and Condition it will please God to assign them.

The same may be said of your Argument drawn from the Doctrine of *Reprobation*. You answer it your self, by supposing that the Doctrine of *absolute Reprobation* is not the Doctrine of Scripture. And as to that *Præterition*, which is barely the not affording all Men the same Means of Knowledge ; 'tis answered in your own Scheme, by what you say (Sect. 45, 46, and 47) concerning the new Trial some Persons may undergo in another State ; and 'tis answered better by supposing that all Men may however be judged in proportion, according to the Equity of the Gospel, though they never had any explicit Knowledge of it.

Lastly, As to your Argument drawn from the Difficulty of reconciling eternal Punishments with the Goodness of God ; That Difficulty does not arise chiefly from the *difference of the Persons*, who may be concerned in those Punishments proportionably in *different degrees* ; but the real difficulty of the Question lies in this, how it is reconcileable with the Goodness of God, to put *any Persons at all* upon a necessity of making such an *Option*, wherein if they choose amiss, the Misery they incur must be irrecoverable. And this difficulty is evidently much bet-

ter answered, by supposing the Souls of Men to be naturally immortal ; so that they who render themselves incapable of Happiness, must consequently fall into remediless Misery ; than it can be answered in *your Scheme*, where none can be liable to endless Punishment, without being miraculously immortalized on purpose, by the Arbitrary Will and Power of God, beyond the original Capacity of their Nature.

And now, Sir, I cannot but earnestly recommend it again to your most serious consideration ; whether the new and inconsiderate Notions you have advanced, and (the Arguments I will not say, because I think you have not offered any that are of any real force, but) the Pretenses of Reason and Authority, which you have put into the hands of sceptical and profane Men, to confirm them in their prejudices against the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul ; are not likely to be of great disservice to Religion ; And whether you ought not (as all good Men are of Opinion you ought) to think of some means of making satisfaction to the Church, to whom you have given so great Offence ; and of preventing

A Letter to Mr Dodwell.

ing the effect of that encouragement, which your Notions in this matter (tho' no Body doubts but it is contrary to your intention) have given to Immorality and contempt of Religion.

If zeal for the defense of a Doctrine of such importance, has in any part of this Letter caused me to drop any Expressions, which may be thought too sharp, and to carry in them too little of that respect, which all the World acknowledges to be justly due to you upon account of your very great Learning ; I know you will pardon it upon such an occasion as this ; and I cannot doubt but upon second Thoughts, you will be somewhat dissatisfied with *your self*, for having published a Book, at which all good Men are sorry, and all profane Men rejoice.

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